

CHINA'S RISE TO POWER: AN EXAMINATION OF DOMESTIC, REGIONAL
AND GLOBAL IMPACTS

by
Melissa Ackermann

A thesis submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts in Global Security Studies

Baltimore, Maryland
May, 2014

© 2014 Melissa Ackermann
All Rights Reserved

ABSTRACT

China's rise to power has become central in Asia-Pacific regional affairs and has irrevocably impacted worldwide politics. Although up to this point, China's rise to power has largely been peaceful, this could change in the future as regional and global partners continue to react to China's increasing power. This thesis explores China's rise to power at three different levels: domestic, regional and global. In doing so, it analyzes various impacts to and of China's rise and the ramifications it could have for the region and the world. Through an examination of various components of international relations theory, each chapter assesses the impacts of this rise and explores China's vulnerabilities. Within China, fragile human security issues exist that could ultimately destabilize the regime and its power. Regionally and internationally, China has allowed its rise to power to take on a negative connotation. This is largely a result of China's aggressive behavior directed towards its neighbors. China must establish its role as a rising power in the larger global arena and how it intends to impact the world. This thesis ascertains that China's rise to power has come to negatively affect relations in the region and the world. It also makes clear the need for China to modify its approach. China's rise to power will have a lasting effect on global affairs and change international relations as we know it.

Thesis Advisors: Drs. Rameez Abbas and Jacob Straus

Thesis Reviewers: Dr. Jacob Straus and Professor Gresser

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: DOMESTICALLY: HOW DOES CHINA'S INTERNAL STABILITY AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS IMPACT ITS LARGER GLOBAL RISE TO POWER	6
LITERATURE REVIEW.....	7
<i>Importance of a Rising Power</i>	8
<i>Human Security</i>	11
<i>Causes of Civil Conflict</i>	15
HYPOTHESIS	19
METHODOLOGY	20
HUMAN SECURITY ISSUES IN CHINA	21
<i>Economic Security</i>	21
<i>Environmental Security</i>	28
<i>Personal Security</i>	33
CONCLUSIONS	37
 CHAPTER 2: REGIONALLY: HOW CHINA'S RISING POWER AFFECTS RELATIONS WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA	 40
LITERATURE REVIEW	41
<i>Soft Power</i>	43
<i>State Alignment Strategies</i>	45
HYPOTHESIS	51
METHODOLOGY	52
CHINA-SOUTHEAST ASIAN RELATIONSHIPS.....	54
<i>China-Vietnam</i>	54
<i>China-Burma</i>	59
<i>China-Philippines</i>	66
CONCLUSIONS	70
 CHAPTER 3: GLOBALLY: CHINA'S ASSERTION OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.....	 71
LITERATURE REVIEW	72
<i>Security Dilemma</i>	73
<i>China's Rise to Power is Not a Threat</i>	77
HYPOTHESIS.....	81
METHODOLOGY	83
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE.....	84
<i>1974 Paracel Island Battle</i>	88
<i>1988 Spratly Island Battle</i>	92
<i>2010-Today the Continuing South China Sea Dispute</i>	94
CONCLUSIONS	103
 BIBLIOGRAPHY	 111
CURRICULUM VITAE	123

INTRODUCTION

China—with the world's largest population, fastest growing economy and a defense budget second only to the United States—is a rising power. China's rise to power will continue to be one of the defining events of the 21st century. It is shaping global affairs and is at the forefront of many states' political and defense agendas. In just a few decades, China went from a country of isolation, with little global interaction, to a country of economic and political interests around the world, from Latin America, to Africa, and to China's own backyard. In the future, China is predicted to become the world's largest economy, to continue to build a worldwide naval force and to be an influential player in world politics. The impact of China's rise is felt on every continent and has begun to make some western observers nervous.

Not only is China's rise affecting global affairs, but it is deeply impacting regional relations within Southeast Asia. The balance of power in the Southeast Asian region has already shifted. Many states are anxious over China's rising power status and how China will use this power, especially with its advancing military capabilities. Ongoing disputes, such as the South China Sea conflict, have brought China's expanding military power to the forefront as China continues to pursue an aggressive agenda over this territory. As a result, many of China's neighbors have begun to diversify their relationships and become less reliant on this unpredictable country.

This thesis explores China's rise to power and its effects at three different levels: domestic, regional, and global. On the domestic level, this thesis examines vulnerabilities to China's rise due to ongoing internal human security problems. Western media, some

politicians, and academics portray China's rise as a strong and direct threat to western interests and ideals. Although this rise is a threat, this thesis argues that there are several domestic human security issues that could ultimately affect China's rise and explores how this might occur. Together, the chapters show that although China has secured increased political influence, economic might, and military capabilities, its increasing power has begun to negatively impact regional and international relations—ultimately creating challenges for its rise. China is using its new status to further pursue its national interests, which has caused neighbors and others to question Chinese intentions. China's assertion in regional and global affairs has also increased due to its expanding power. This thesis seeks to explore and better understand some of these complexities.

The first chapter asks how China's internal stability and domestic affairs impacts its global rise to power. Behind China's rising power status, is a fragile set of human security issues that could greatly impact China's progress as an up and coming power. Chinese power is built on a fragile domestic system at great risk for instability. Issues such as unemployment, pollution, and human rights violations are mounting problems for the rising power. These domestic issues are ultimately intertwined and cause an equal threat to stability. Not only does this chapter explore these potential trigger points, but it investigates how civil unrest could occur in China, ultimately derailing China's rise. This chapter looks at three of the United Nations seven human security elements including, economic security, environmental security, and personal security and examines what, if any threat they pose to Chinese domestic stability. These three elements of human security were chosen because they are assessed to be high risk factors leading to possible

Chinese unrest. Through this study an assessment of how civil conflict might transpire within China becomes clearer.

The first chapter concludes by arguing that a large number of severe domestic problems which exist in China, allows for a high probability of unrest in China's future. No one human security issue is of a greater threat to China than another, due to the interconnection between these issues. Environmental, economic and personal security problems all have an effect on each other. Early signs of unrest such as protests and citizen discontent do exist within China; however, the conditions for such a massive uprising are not yet volatile. In time this will likely change and unrest could occur with little warning, since many of the conditions are already present in Chinese society. If economic growth in China continues to slow and more people face economic hardships, combined with the economic and personal security issues, unrest and instability could ensue.

The focus of the second chapter is to address how China's rise to power is affecting its interstate relations in Southeast Asia. Relations between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors are becoming increasingly important as China's power continues to expand. China's rising strength has made neighboring states anxious concerning future relations in the region. Through the context of state alignment strategies, three specific relationships will be explored—China's relations with Vietnam, Burma, and the Philippines—to investigate the impact of China's rise to power on regional economic, military, and political relations and how these countries are in turn responding. These three cases have a wide range of historic relations and alignment strategies with China, which will provide a broad context to understanding these

relationship changes. By looking through the scope of state alignment strategies this thesis will be able to explore the direct affect China's increasing power has had on regional relationships.

The second chapter determines that relationships between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors have already been negatively impacted due to China's expanding power. China's neighbors are growing increasingly concerned over the growth of Chinese power and aggression, especially its military force. This stems from both a historic past of Chinese aggression and the recent upsurge in hostility now backed by a powerful military. This argument is supported by the three case studies, which conclude that all three countries are diversifying their relations to become less reliant on China. In fact, all three countries were found to be improving relations with the United States and amongst each other in order to become less dependent on China. The Vietnam and Burma case studies even suggest that both countries have begun to change their historic alignment strategies due to China's increasing power.

The third and final chapter asks how has China's level of assertion over its territorial rights in the South China Sea affected its relations with the United States. Three periods of high level of Chinese assertion were examined to determine how the United States has previously and is currently reacting to Chinese aggression and if relations between the two countries has changed as a result of Chinese actions over this territorial dispute. Naval battles involving China in 1974, 1988, and the increase in tensions between 2010 and today over the South China Sea were explored to judge US responses during these periods of heightened Chinese assertion.

China's level of assertion in the South China Sea has not altered considerably over the past several decades. What has changed is China's level of power, which has made both China's neighbors and the United States anxious over China's future intentions, especially in regards to its expanding military capabilities, and how China could use them in the future. The United States has changed its policy over the South China Sea dispute in response to an increase in China's rise and not as a result of Chinese assertion. China is an up and coming powerhouse that could ultimately challenge US hegemony and change the balance of power at the international level. The United States has become increasingly wary of China's increased power. The future of US-Chinese relations is currently being played out over the South China Sea conflict.

CHAPTER 1: DOMESTICALLY: HOW CHINA'S INTERNAL STABILITY AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS IMPACTED ITS GLOBAL RISE TO POWER

China, with the world's largest population, one of the fastest growing economies, and a defense budget second only to the United States, is a rising power. Behind this rising giant, however, is a fragile set of human security issues that could greatly impact China's progress. China is internally weaker than it appears. Issues such as unemployment, pollution, and human rights violations are mounting problems. These human security issues could ultimately derail China's rise by creating domestic instability. How China reacts to and handles human security problems could determine how and if China's rise continues. Not only could these domestic problems impact China's future but they could also significantly affect foreign investment and diplomatic relations. This chapter asks, how does China's internal stability and domestic affairs impacted its larger global rise to power. These internal stability issues include economic problems, environmental degradation, and human rights violations. These problems will be investigated through the context of human security and other literature focused on how civil conflict begins. With such a large population and a still developing country, these domestic problems could result in violence or even potentially the downfall of the current regime. The recent Arab Spring is a reminder of how internal issues can ultimately topple regimes and instill change. The more instability China experiences, the greater the probability that its rise to power could be short-term. These domestic problems are examined in the context of human security and its fundamental role in stability.

Literature Review

In the late 1970s, China began reforming its economy by opening its communist based markets. Since this transformation, China has become a rising power with its economy, military strength, and political influence increasing rapidly. China's position, however, is fragile. China's rise has made regional politics more volatile and put the international community on edge, including the United States, which, in 2010, announced a military pivot towards Asia. Although China appears to be an emerging international powerhouse, domestically China is actually weaker than it appears. Internal domestic issues and human security problems inside China are a large reason why its rising status is fragile.

This literature review explores China's rise to power, its importance, and how internal unrest could ultimately undermine this rise and set China back. First, this section will analyze the connection between international affairs and domestic policies, looking at how the two intertwine and affect each other. Both the external and internal factors that tie foreign and domestic policy are examined to understand how China's rise could be affected due to domestic instability. This literature review also explores the new theory of human security and its role in international relations, specifically human security's emerging importance in understanding why domestic unrest occurs. Next, this section will look into the causes of civil conflict to establish a baseline as to why civil unrest occurs and what it could mean for China. Lastly, it will investigate the idea of creeping democratization and if this is possibly occurring in China, adding to existing domestic problems. Examining these theories and policies will help determine how China's domestic policies and issues could ultimately affect its rise to power.

Importance of a Rising Power

In order to fully understand the importance of a state's increasing power and the need for stability from the domestic population, we must first understand what a rising power is and its importance in international affairs. According to Hart and Jones, there is no commonly accepted definition of a rising power, nor is there an internationally recognized set of traits.¹ In fact, all rising powers exist under different circumstances, which can make determining a specific definition difficult. While a specific definition does not exist, Hart and Jones do present several commonalities that rising powers usually exhibit. These include: emerging economic might, aspiring influential role in international affairs, internal cohesion, and expanding military and political resources.² Further, a rising power must also be able to interact with other strong states on the international level. China displays a number of these characteristics and can be categorized as a rising power because of its economic strength, expanding military, and increasing role on the international level.

According to realists, a nation's interests are shaped by the amount of power it holds and therefore it is within every state's interest to attempt to expand its amount of power, so it can seek greater national interests, thus leading to more international influence.³ The transformation to a rising power is a slow process and can take decades for a state to achieve. With additional power, states continue to seek more political and economic influence and may even expand its military. In China's case, this rise to power

¹ Andrew Hart and Bruce Jones, "How Do Rising Powers Rise?" *Survival* 52, No. 6, (2010): 65.

² Ibid, 65.

³ Randall L. Schweller, "Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory," *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power*, (New York: Routledge, 1999), 2.

began with the reform of its markets in 1978, which accelerated the growth of the Chinese economy and eventually led to increased economic, military, and political influence.⁴ The more power a state has the more influence it can exert in the global arena and over weaker states. Not only can rising powers upset the balance of power in a region, they can use their new influence to apply political, economic, or military pressure to smaller weaker states. This is why a rising power, especially if it is a close neighbor, can be such a dangerous threat to smaller, often weaker states. Some states in Southeast Asia have begun to feel threatened by China's strength and have begun exploring options to expand their economic, military, and diplomatic ties in order to be less dependent on China.

Connection between Foreign and Domestic Policies

As the world becomes more globalized, it is increasingly clear that everything is interconnected. In fact, both internal and external factors in international relations can have an effect on a state's foreign policy. In China's case, its foreign policy is used to continue its rise to power. As Beasley and Snarr note, "Foreign policy is typically the result of many domestic and international factors....Both types (internal and external factors), work directly and independently to influence a state's foreign policy."⁵ There is a clear connection between domestic policies, internal state issues, and a state's foreign policy decisions. The relationship between internal and external factors is crucial in how a state might respond to internal instability and how that might affect its larger global

⁴ Hart and Jones, 64-66.

⁵ Beasley and Snarr, *Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior*, (Washington DC: QC Press, 2002), 341.

stance or outlook. It is important to understand this relationship since this chapter is looking into China's internal factors and their influence on China's foreign policy.

External factors, or those from outside a state, can impact the domestic and political landscape of a country. External factors include other actors or an issue. These external actors could include other states, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and foreign firms. According to Beasley and Snarr, they could also include issues such as democratization pressures, world opinion on human rights, and globalization.⁶ In China's case, often faced are external pressures over human rights and democratization issues. For example, when China was applying for membership to the World Trade Organization it faced strong scrutiny regarding its human rights violations, and questions about the intentions of the regime. In this case, China faced external pressures over internal issues which factored into its foreign policy.⁷

Internal factors also play a major role when determining a state's foreign policy. Internal factors are those from within a state. Things such as a state's economic situation, the regime in power, and citizens' opinions all affect state foreign policy decisions. A state may choose to adjust its foreign policy due to the internal environment. For example, if a state is dealing with domestic unrest it may relocate resources from its foreign policy and use them to address the domestic issues. For this chapter, internal factors are closely examined to determine the effect they have or could have as China continues to rise. As China opened up its markets and postured itself to become an up-and-coming power, it

⁶ Beasley and Snarr, *Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior*, 343.

⁷ Nicholas R Lardy, "China's WTO Membership," *The Brookings Institute*, 27 February 2009, at <http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/21627>.

continues to closely monitor domestic affairs to prevent the collapse of the regime.⁸

China's greatest fear is to lose power. Because China is so focused on domestic unrest, it could return to its past of isolationism. Isolationism is the policy of abstaining from political or economic relations with other countries.⁹ This policy limits foreign involvement and therefore the possible consequences of foreign relations, including conflict. Isolationism also allows the country to focus on its domestic situation without the involvement of external factors as discussed above. China was an isolationist state throughout its history, most recently under Mao Zedong in 1949; however, the reforms of 1978 lifted this policy of seclusion.

Although China is extremely focused on domestic stability, economic growth, and regime strength, it is highly unlikely that China will return to a policy of isolationism. China will continue to denounce attempts by other countries that interfere in its domestic affairs. Additionally, China cannot economically afford to return to a policy of isolationism. In this era of globalization, China's economy is rooted in international markets and it has expanded its alliance network worldwide from Africa to South America. Many of the internal factors that China is focused on are labeled in international relations as human security issues. These internal problems are actually a threat to China's national security and rise to power.

Human Security

Human Security is a relatively new concept in the international relations field that has only emerged in the last two decades. Traditionally, security has been thought of in

⁸ Michael Yahuda, *Towards the End of Isolationism: China's Foreign Policy After Mao*, (St. Martin's Press: New York, 1983), 25.

⁹ Ibid.

terms of protection of the nation-state involving conventional militaries, strategies, and tactics. According to Steven Walt, the traditional definition of security in international relations is the “threat, use and control of military forces” by nation-states.¹⁰ Following the end of the Cold War, academics and policymakers began to notice that traditional security of a nation-state did not necessarily guarantee security of citizens. People continued to die in internal state conflicts regardless of the relative peace between nation-states. Violence and instability still existed without problems at the international and regional levels. Academics, as well as policymakers including Robert McNamara, also pointed to environmental degradation and natural disasters as threats to human security that they believed should demand as much attention as conventional military conflicts.¹¹ Many academics began to believe that a state’s stability was dependent upon the domestic population and these factors. As Axworthy explains, “Peace and security—national, regional and international—are all possible only if they are derived from peoples’ security.”¹² Citizens and domestic affairs are often key to peace and prosperity. The term human security was used to fill this void in security studies.

What is Human Security?

The term human security was first used in the 1994 *United Nations Human Development Report*. The report stated that:

The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign

¹⁰ Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (March 1991): 212.

¹¹ Robert S. McNamara, *The Essence of Security: Reelections in Office*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1968); and Richard Ullman, “Redefining Security,” *International Security*, Vol. 8 No.3, (1983): 131.

¹² Lloyd Axworthy, “Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First,” *Global Governance* Vol. 7, No. 1 (Jan.–Mar. 2001): 23.

policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust....Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives.¹³

The report goes on to identify seven elements of human security, which include economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security.

Human security goes beyond the traditional security model and looks at individuals within a society and how internal problems within a state could impact the larger international community. This concept focuses on the individual rather than the international or state as the important actor. As Axworthy explains, “Human security today puts people first and recognizes that their safety is integral to the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security.”¹⁴ Other definitions of human security also exist. For example, Jorge Nef adds cultural security, or traditional values, and collective experiences of a group of people to the list of elements covered by human security.¹⁵ Reed and Tehranian argue that human security is not just about physical security but should include psychological security, or “the freedom from fear, right to privacy and tolerance of differences,” and communication security, or “the freedom and balance of information flows.”¹⁶

Numerous academics and policymakers believe that the term human security is defined too broadly and therefore is of little use. Paris, King and Murray all agree that the concept of human security actually lacks a real definition and the term is vague,

¹³ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 22.

¹⁴ Axworthy, “Human Security and Global Governance.” 20.

¹⁵ Jorge Nef, *Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability*, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, (1999): 16.

¹⁶ Reed and Tehranian, “Evolving Security Regimes,” *Worlds Apart: Human Security and Global Governance*, Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research, New York, (1999): 39, 47.

encompassing a large range of issues all of which cannot and should not be covered under the human security umbrella.¹⁷ King and Murray offer a definition of human security as one's "expectation of years of life without experiencing the state of generalized poverty."¹⁸ Paris, however, argues that King and Murray narrow the definition of human security by instead favoring certain values of human security over others without proper justification.¹⁹ He goes on to say that under the King-Murray formula there can exist a high level of human security yet one can still be a victim of violence due to state policies. Paris suggests instead of defining and creating criteria for human security, it should be used as a label to study non-military threats to states and individuals, thereby dividing human security topics from traditional security studies.²⁰ Making human security a broad label, however, does little to narrow the scope or help to define the term to derive better analysis.

Although there is plenty of argument over what should or should not be included in the definition or as the components of human security, all of the authors and academics cited agree that human security is an important theme and has a place in security studies. Human security, or lack thereof, can be a source of violence, specifically domestically, that can lead to problems both within a state and internationally. As Axworthy notes, "This international discourse on human security is beginning to effect change on the institutions and practice of global governance. In this interconnected world, our own security is increasingly indivisible from that of our neighbors—at home and abroad."²¹

¹⁷ Roland Paris, "Human Security, Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?" *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 2, (Fall 2001): 2; and Gary King and Christopher JL Murray, "Rethinking Human Security," *Political Science Quarterly* 116, (2002): 586-588.

¹⁸ King and Murray, 592.

¹⁹ Paris, 95.

²⁰ Ibid, 96.

²¹ Axworthy, "Human Security and Global Governance." 20.

The elements of human security outlined by the United Nations are essential needs and rights that all human beings should be entitled to. As these basic needs are violated, unrest can occur; people feel their lives are in danger or they lack what they believe should be guaranteed, and this leads to conflict. This chapter uses the United Nation's original definition and components of human security. The case studies below detail the human security issues in China and the possible impact on China's rise to power both regionally and internationally.

Causes of Civil Conflict

When individuals' human security is at risk, civil conflict can often result. According to Singer and Small, a civil war is defined as a war that occurs between groups within a single state's boundaries.²² Most causes of civil conflict can be linked to the idea that people become fearful when their economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community or political security is in jeopardy. Beyond the human security aspect, there are other variables that can lead to the eruption of civil conflict within a society. This section focuses on literature relating to the economic and environmental variables leading to civil strife.

Variables to Civil Conflict

Beyond the human security element, there are several economic variables that may factor into a state's likelihood for civil conflict. Collier and Hoeffler identified four main variables that are strong determinates to both the probability and the duration of

²² Melvin Small and David Singer. *Resort to Arms: International and Civil War, 1816–1980*. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982), 205-206.

civil conflict.²³ The first is opportunity cost of a rebellion. Collier and Hoeffler found that in countries that have higher per capita incomes, higher levels of education, and an increasing economic growth, the lesser the chance that a civil war would break out.²⁴ Collier and Hoeffler believe that this is because in states with incomes and education, the cost benefit of a conflict would not be in the citizen's best interest. Second, Collier and Hoeffler look at the availability of finance and argue that primary commodity exports can often generate further grievances, corruption and therefore poor governance.²⁵ This type of commodity export is often natural resources. Ross argues that there is a strong correlation between some natural resources, such as oil, and civil conflict due to the resources' necessity and the level of greed associated with it.²⁶ Third, the authors believe that certain grievances such as inequality, lack of political rights, ethnic polarization, and religious fractionalization play into the causes of a rebellion.²⁷ Last, Collier and Hoeffler argue that the larger the population of a state, the greater the risk of internal conflict. The larger the population, the larger the number of grievances and disgruntled people there are.

The Role of Youth in Civil Conflict

Not only is a state's domestic environment a source of internal conflict, but so are the demographics of a state. The youth bulge is an international relations theory which argues that a state with a large population of young people, specifically males, has a

²³ Paul Collier and Anne Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 56, iss. 4, (October 2004): 588.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Michael Ross, "What do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?" *Journal of Peace Research*, 41, (2004): 337.

²⁷ Collier and Hoeffler, 589.

higher chance of creating or participating in civil conflict.²⁸ Young men are historically a volatile portion of a population and are often a main faction in causing unrest.²⁹ A lot of literature has pointed to this being a problem in developing countries throughout Africa and the Middle East where unemployment among the youth is widespread. Although China is not necessarily facing a youth bulge due to the rapidly aging society, it does have a large male surplus. It is estimated by the year 2020 there will be 35 million young males who are unable to marry due to the one child policy and surplus of males born in the 1980's and 90's.³⁰ History has shown that violent youth lead protests can occur in China, the most famous example Tiananmen Square. Recently, China's youth has yet to cause a major uprising, probably because China's economy has been strong and continuing to grow. As China faces many domestic issues and its economy begins to slow, this large population of males could present a problem to China's internal stability.

The Role of Chinese Politics

Politics within China is a key component to not only China's rise in power, but in how they conduct their foreign affairs and handle domestic unrest and human security issues. In 1949, Mao Zedong, the leader of China's Communist Party at the time, established China as a communist country; between 1949 and 1978, China was a traditional communist system³¹ that was rooted in a Marxist-Leninist structure with a

²⁸ Richard Cincotta, "Half a Chance: Youth Bulges and Transitions to Liberal Democracy," Environmental Change and Security Program Report, 13, (2009): 10-18, at <http://www.popline.org/node/207725#sthash.oOQpRxBC.dpuf>.

²⁹ Anne Hendrixson, "The 'Youth Bulge': Defining the Next Generation of Young Men as a Threat to the Future," A Publication of the Population and Development Program at Hampshire College No. 19, (Winter 2003): 1.

³⁰ Kathleen E. McLaughlin, "Why China Won't Revolt," *Global Post*, 5 March 2011, at <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/110304/why-china-wont-revolt>.

³¹ As compared to its current Communist system that incorporates liberal market principles.

Maoist twist focused on military doctrine and rural development. Beginning in 1978, when Deng Xiaoping took power, the Chinese communist model was transformed. The transformation put China on its path to becoming a rising power. Deng initiated the “Reform and Opening Up” policy, which embraced capitalist market principles while staying true to socialist ideals. The Chinese government called this “Socialism with Chinese Characters,” or adapting a market system to fit with a socialist political system. The Chinese government has continued to state that this policy is the “only and successful road China must take in building it into a well-off, democratic, civilized and harmonious modern nation.”³² China opened up its borders to free trade and international commerce. Although this policy led to China’s booming economy, it also has brought social issues that the Chinese Communist Party did not foresee.

Despite China’s move away from the communist economic model, it continues to cling to a totalitarian leadership model. Minxin Pei explains this phenomenon as “Creeping Democratization.” Minxin argues that China cannot continue as an authoritarian state while maintaining an open economy.³³ He goes on to discuss the subtle changes that have begun in China’s political institutions such as the establishment of checks and balances and law at the local level.³⁴ Democratization complements a market economy and Chinese citizens are coming to expect greater rights and freedoms that often come with the opportunities in an open economy. The current economic system is not compatible with Chinese governance and this has the potential to cause unrest in China. As Shirk notes, the more developed and well off China becomes, the more

³² The 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, “Socialism with Chinese Characters,” at <http://english.people.com.cn/90002/92169/92211/6275043.html>.

³³ Minxin Pei, “Creeping Democratization in China,” *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 6, Number 4, (October 1995): 66.

³⁴ Ibid.

threatened the government becomes because the citizens feel entitled to more.³⁵ This creeping democratization has the potential to cause mass unrest as Chinese citizens feel denied freedoms and human security issues arise.

China's reform to an open market economy may be why the regime has continued to remain strong and unrest has not yet impacted China. Since China's economic reforms, the Chinese economy has greatly expanded leading to economic benefits for many citizens. In fact over 300 million people are part of the new middle class in China, seeing economic wealth that was impossible under the socialist market system.³⁶ This growth has helped to maintain stability throughout China. Civil conflict is often tied to economic conditions as discussed earlier. For example, the collapse of the Soviet Union and unrest in several Middle Eastern countries during the Arab Spring were spurred by economic downturns. The social conditions in these countries were right for unrest and poor economic performance lead to social instability, ultimately bringing down governments. In China, the economic growth has begun to slow after decades of colossal development. This slowdown could ultimately sets off unrest throughout the country.

Hypothesis

China is a rising power and potentially the world's next superpower. However, China must address several human security issues among its domestic population including economic security, environmental security, and personal security in order to continue on its path to power. If China does not address these issues then domestic unrest could severely harm or slow China's overall rise to power including its economic and

³⁵ Minxin Pei, "Creeping Democratization in China," 70.

³⁶ Tami Luhby, "China's Growing Middle Class," April 26, 2012, at <http://money.cnn.com/2012/04/25/news/economy/china-middle-class>.

political systems. In the future, depending upon the severity of these issues, the regime's security could potentially be jeopardized. Although another Tiananmen Square is by no means looming, China, to maintain the status quo, should consider quickly addressing and finding solutions to these human security problems. As China continues to develop, its citizens are likely to become more organized and more determined to demand changes that will increase prosperity. As China becomes wealthier, citizens will come to expect more freedoms and democratic values that are promoted by capitalism. By examining China's internal domestic vulnerabilities, one is able to see how fragile China really is and how quickly the rising giant could crumble from the inside.

Methodology

In examining China's internal domestic situation and its fragile nature, this chapter focuses on three specific domestic policy and human security areas: economic security, environmental security, and personal security. These three elements of human security were chosen because they are the elements I considered to be of greatest threat to Chinese stability. By looking at these top three human security threat we can assess if one, all, or a combination of could cause domestic unrest. These three case studies examine potential areas of unrest that could undermine Chinese rising power, look at the problems that exist in each security area, how the Chinese government is responding, and the possible outcome if these issues are not addressed. After examining each of the case studies it becomes more apparent how weak China actually is and the magnitude of its internal domestic problems.

HUMAN SECURITY ISSUES IN CHINA

Economic Security

China's economy has been the fastest growing economy in the world during the past three decades since the reforms of 1978. For over thirty years, growth has averaged about 9 percent and economists estimate that China could become the world's largest economy by 2035.³⁷ This economic growth has meant higher living standards and overall improvement in several social areas, including education and health care. These high numbers, however, only illustrate a portion of China's economic figures. Other economic measurements show the actual extent of economic problems in China including high rates of unemployment, inequality, and rapid urbanization. These are all issues that affect China's domestic population and its economic security. For example, although China's overall economy has quickly risen and it has the second largest economy in the world, its per capita GDP in 2012 was only \$6,188 according to the World Bank, substantially different from the top economy in the world, the United States, whose per capita GDP in 2012 was \$49,965.³⁸ Although China's overall economy is growing, underlying domestic economic conditions continue to present a problem that could ultimately derail China's rise. This case study focuses on the problems of inequality, unemployment, urbanization, and sustaining economic growth in China.

³⁷ Minxin Pei "Strategic Asia 2006-2007: Trade, Interdependence and Security," The National Bureau of Asian Research, at http://www.nbr.org/publications/strategic_asia/pdf/Preview/SA06/SA06_ChinaReform_preview.pdf; Bergsten, Gill, Lardy and Mitchell, *The Balance Sheet, China What the World Needs to Know About the Emerging Superpower*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2006), 19.

³⁸ The World Bank, "GDP Per Capita," at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>.

Unemployment in China

Unemployment is a large economic problem that faces China today. Not only does unemployment negatively impact the economy but it can also be a large destabilizing factor among the population. As of June 2013, China had a reported unemployment number of 4.1 percent according to the Ministry of Social Security and Human Resources.³⁹ This official number has been largely unchanged for the last decade. Actual unemployment numbers were estimated to be near 8 percent in 2011, double the official number, according to a Chinese-run academic survey.⁴⁰ The difference in numbers is in part because the Chinese government only reports the urban workers and those who are eligible for unemployment benefits, excluding the migrant and rural populations which make up large portions of the unemployed.⁴¹ Many Chinese economists believe that the true unemployment numbers are actually much higher, reaching double digits in some regions of China.⁴² Overall, the unemployment problem is more severe than Chinese officials let on.

The majority of Chinese unemployment stems from three main groups: migrant workers, former employees of state-owned factories, and students. China has a large population of migrant workers. In 1949, only 11 percent of the Chinese population lived in the mere 69 official cities in China.⁴³ Today that number is more than 52.6 percent.⁴⁴

³⁹Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People's Republic of China, "First Half of the 725 Million New Jobs in Cities and Towns," at http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyshbzb/dongtaixinwen/shizhengyaowen/201307/t20130726_108635.htm.

⁴⁰ *The Wall Street Journal*, "Chinese Survey Shows Higher Jobless Rate," at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323316804578164784240097900.html>.

⁴¹ Dexter Roberts, "Divining Unemployment in China," *Bloomberg Businessweek*, 26 July 2013, at <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-07-26/divining-unemployment-in-china>.

⁴² Susan Shirk, *China Fragile Superpower*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 29.

⁴³ Ya Ping Wang, *Urban Poverty, Housing and Social Change in China*, (New York: Routledge, 2004), 25.

⁴⁴ *Xinhua*, "China's Urban Population Suppressed Rural by 2011," 28 May 2013, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/video/2013-05/28/c_132414171.htm.

Migrants continue to come to urban centers in order to seek employment. The economy, however, cannot keep up with the growing number of people seeking jobs; hence unemployment.⁴⁵ The influx of additional people also makes it difficult for those who already reside in urban areas to find jobs. China does not count migrant workers in official unemployment numbers, but it is estimated there are approximately 120 million unemployed migrant workers.⁴⁶ High unemployment among migrant workers has the potential to be dangerous to state stability. Migrants without work often return to rural homelands. With little to do and such large numbers of people out of work, this could be cause for the people to organize against the government. Over the past two decades, cases of rural unrest have dramatically increased both in frequency and size.⁴⁷ The Chinese government has always been fearful of rural unrest because they themselves know what could come from such a movement. Mao, for example, organized his own revolution using peasants from the rural countryside. Rural stability is one reason why maintaining a low unemployment rate throughout China is so important.

China is also facing a high rate of student unemployment. In 2009, an estimated 32 percent of recent college graduates were unable to secure work right out of school.⁴⁸ The Chinese job market is unable to supply jobs at the levels needed, in part due to the rapid increase in the number of graduates.⁴⁹ Unemployment at these levels among young people can be highly destabilizing in a society. As noted in the literature review, young men between the ages of 15 and 29 have a higher likelihood of participating in domestic

⁴⁵ Bergsten, Gill, Lardy and Mitchell, *The Balance Sheet, China What the World Needs to Know About the Emerging Superpower*, 32.

⁴⁶ Austin Ramzy, "Migrant Workers Suddenly Idle in China," *Time*, 1 February 2009, at <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1868667,00.html>.

⁴⁷ Shirk, 60.

⁴⁸ Zhao Litao & Huang Yanjie, "Unemployment Problem of China's Youth," East Asia Institute, 28 April 2010, at <http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB523.pdf>.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

unrest, especially when they have nothing to do. Additionally, as Shirk points out, “These are the individuals who would be capable of organizing and leading an opposition movement.”⁵⁰ China has already witnessed violence that stemmed from student-led demonstrations. Many of those who participated in the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests were students who were calling for democratic reforms.⁵¹ Although the Tiananmen Square protests were not over unemployment, student unemployment and poor economic conditions can be dangerous for a state due to discontent and poor living conditions. Fear of violence due to unemployment is the main reason why the Chinese government is so determined to continue to keep their growth rate steady at 7.5 percent.⁵² The problem of unemployment in China will continue to increase as every year more students graduate from University unable to find work. In 2013, according to the Chinese Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, 6.99 million students are set to graduate, an increase of 190,000 over 2012.⁵³ Every year there is a continued increase in unemployed students. China knows what the consequences could be if economic conditions continue to fall and citizens are unable to find work.

Inequality in China

The 1978 economic reforms in China and subsequent development have increased economic levels throughout the country, bringing prosperity and wealth to greater portions of China. This has also created a problem throughout China; the gap between the

⁵⁰ Shirk, *China the Fragile Superpower*, 30.

⁵¹ T. David Mason and Jonathan Clements, “Tiananmen Square Thirteen Years After: The Prospects for Civil Unrest in China,” *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Fall 2002): 164.

⁵² Chinese Government, “The 10th Five Year Plan (2001-2005),” at http://english.gov.cn/2006-04/05/content_245624.htm.

⁵³ Chinese Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, “6.99 Million Grads set to Hit Market,” at http://www.china.org.cn/china/2013-05/20/content_28875009.htm.

rich and poor continues to grow, creating inequality. According to a study by a Chinese University, China's inequality in 2010 was one of the highest in the world.⁵⁴ As one economist has warned, "...the growing income gap, and the rise of a new class of wealthy officials and entrepreneurs, has stirred resentment among the poor which could lead to 'all types of social instability.'"⁵⁵ Although income inequality occurs in many countries, it is significant in China because the level of inequality is rather high, and coupled with other grievances, could become a trigger for unrest. Before the economic reforms in China, inequality was extremely low because of the communist economic structure and state-controlled wages.⁵⁶ In fact, the large levels of inequality go back to Minxin's theory of "creeping democratization." With a market economy, people not only want more prosperity but also feel entitled to it.

Income inequality is hardly just a problem between the urban and rural areas. In fact, some academics believe that Chinese inequality could be regional and the result of the peoples' inability to relocate under Hukou, China's registration system.⁵⁷ This system not only prevents rural workers from receiving many state benefits such as health care but also restricts individuals' ability to migrate from rural to urban areas. Certain Chinese states also have a better geographic location and are therefore more economically prosperous. For example, those that live in close proximity to ports, neighboring economic partners and in areas that receive more government-sponsored development

⁵⁴ Shen Hu, "China's Gini Index at 0.61, University Report Says," *Caixin Online*, at <http://english.caixin.com/2012-12-10/100470648.html>.

⁵⁵ "Social Unrest in China" Quoted by Minnie Chan, "Graft is Widening Wealthy Gap: Economist," *South China Morning Post*, 20 September 2005.

⁵⁶ Bergsten, Gill, Lardy and Mitchell, *The Balance Sheet, China What the World Needs to Know About the Emerging Superpower*, 30.

⁵⁷ Ravi Kanbur and Ziao-Bo Zhang, "Which Regional Inequality? The Evolution of Rural-Urban and Inland-Coastal Inequality in China from 1983-1995," *Journal of Comparative Economics*, Vol. 27, Iss. 4, (1999): 690.

tend to have higher standards of living versus those states that are landlocked and see little economic development. Although developing countries often have high levels of inequality, China's levels are so high that economic development has not been able to bridge the inequality gap.⁵⁸

In early 2013, in order to address the inequality gap, Prime Minister Li Keqiang announced a plan to continue China's urbanization. According to news reports, Prime Minister Li wanted to cut the rural population by roughly half (approximately 642 million people) by forcing resettlement to urban areas.⁵⁹ This policy is aimed at increasing the workforce, closing the income gap, and helping create an economy based on consumption.⁶⁰ The main critique of this policy, however, is that China already faces high levels of urbanization, which in itself is a potential economic security risk. According to some estimates, over the last decade China's urban population has expanded by more than 200 million people.⁶¹ This growth has put stress on the housing market, urban infrastructure, and employment in cities.⁶² As migration to the city continues, levels of unemployment in urban areas will continue to increase. Although urbanization has economic benefits, the movement of people to urban centers needs to be controlled. If high levels of urbanization occur in a short period, it can be more detrimental to a city than beneficial.

⁵⁸ Bergsten, Gill, Lardy and Mitchell, *The Balance Sheet, China What the World Needs to Know About the Emerging Superpower*, 30-31.

⁵⁹ Dexter Roberts, "Premier Li Keqiang Wants More Chinese in the Cities," *Bloomberg Businessweek*, 6 June 2013, at <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-06-06/premier-li-keqiang-wants-more-chinese-in-the-cities>.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Bergsten, Gill, Lardy and Mitchell, *The Balance Sheet, China What the World Needs to Know About the Emerging Superpower*, 31.

⁶² Ya Ping Wang, *Urban Poverty, Housing and Social Change in China*, 36.

Sustaining Economic Growth

The Chinese government's main domestic policies have been and continue to be aimed at sustaining economic growth, not only for its continued rise to power but as a way to keep the domestic population stable. As mentioned previously, the Chinese leadership fears a revolt from its populace and believes maintaining a high rate of economic growth will keep the domestic environment stable. For three decades China has maintained a growth rate averaging 10 percent.⁶³ As Shirk points out, these high levels of growth are very rare in economic history and difficult to maintain.⁶⁴ Although China's economic growth has already survived the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and the Asian financial crisis in 1998, a future economic crisis or period of domestic unrest could crumble China's economy, causing greater unemployment and instability. China's economy is fragile and a market downturn or political turmoil could unravel the entire system.

China has, and continues to remain, focused on overall economic growth. The government understands that economic growth is strongly tied to stability. In fact, all of the government's twelve five-year plans have included economic growth as a main priority of the Chinese state. Since 2001, the Communist Party has established an economic growth goal of at least 7.5 percent.⁶⁵ This goal is aimed at what economists' project China needs to attain in order to sustain healthy levels of employment.⁶⁶ With

⁶³ Bergsten, Freeman, Lardy and Mitchell, "China's Rise: Challenges and Opportunities," Washington DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies, (2008): 105.

⁶⁴ Shirk, *China the Fragile Superpower*, 20.

⁶⁵ Chinese Government, "The 10th Five Year Plan (2001-2005)."

⁶⁶ Shirk, 55.

such a large population, China needs dramatic levels of growth every year in order to reach the projection.

Susan Shirk believes that China's economy can continue to grow at its current rate for at least two more decades as long as a political or economic crisis does not occur.⁶⁷ Although the Chinese government appears strong and resilient, that is in part because the Chinese economy has continued to grow. Economists, however, believe that starting in 2009; China's overall economy began to slow, still growing but just at much lower levels.⁶⁸ There are differing opinions as to what this economic slowdown means for China. Some argue that this slowdown is natural since it is unrealistic for an economy to maintain a high rate of growth for decades.⁶⁹ Others believe that perhaps China's economy is starting to shift towards a consumer-driven economy versus an export-based economy.⁷⁰ Whatever the reason for the slowdown, China needs to remain watchful. As the economy continues to slow, the regime will now face a larger threat to its stability and overall hold on power.

Environmental Security

China's severe environmental issues are greatly impacting the land as well as China's population. Severe smog smothers China's cities, acid rain falls from the sky, forests are disappearing, and fresh water continues to become scarcer. The large migrations of people, rapid industrialization and lack of government control have

⁶⁷ Shirk, *China the Fragile Superpower*, 20.

⁶⁸ Dexter Roberts, "A Slowing China Needs Reform," *Bloomberg Businessweek*, 9 October 2013 at <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-10-09/a-slowng-china-needs-reform>.

⁶⁹ Shirk, *China the Fragile Superpower*, 19-20.

⁷⁰ *Economist*, "China's Consumer Led Growth," 20 October 2012, at <http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/10/rebalancing-china>.

exacerbated the problem. The Chinese government has recognized that environmental issues exist but has failed to provide an adequate response to address these problems. Interestingly enough, many of these environmental problems are in part a result of the economic boom in China and of pressure from the Chinese government to produce economic results without concern for the effects.⁷¹ The lack of response from the government has begun to stir protests and activism in China. Chinese citizens are becoming more conscious of health problems that can stem from these issues and of the negative impact pollution is having on the environment. This case study looks at two areas of concern, water scarcity and the high levels of pollution. Both of these environmental issues present human security problems to the population and can potentially be sources of unrest if people fear their security is threatened.

Water Scarcity

Water is a basic need, essential to human life, and without it, people cannot survive. Freshwater resources are becoming progressively scarce throughout China. China's current rate of water usage is unsustainable. China's rivers are drying up and what fresh water China does have is often unusable, due to the high level of pollutants.⁷² China is facing a severe water crisis, a human security problem that could ultimately affect domestic stability. According to Chellaney, security issues posed by water shortages could include: political instability, lack of economic modernization, public

⁷¹ Bergsten, Gill, Lardy and Mitchell, *The Balance Sheet, China What the World Needs to Know About the Emerging Superpower*, 54.

⁷² Scott Moore, "Climate Change, Water and China's National Interest," *China Security*, Vol. 5 No. 3, (2009): 26.

health, and food security.⁷³ Water shortages in poor and underdeveloped regions of China could also cause mass migrations of environmental refugees.⁷⁴ With water being essential to life, serious domestic unrest would ensue if China's water shortage reaches critical levels.

China's government is responding to its water crisis by building new infrastructure rather than establishing firm environmental reforms. They have begun work on a massive multi-decade water transfer project called the "South-North Water Transfer Project." The idea is to transfer water through a set of channels up to northern city centers from the south, where water is more abundant.⁷⁵ This program, however, has created further human security problems for the regime. It is estimated that so far the project has displaced 300,000 people from their homes.⁷⁶ Residents have protested the project and removal from their land. According to Chellaney, collectively, Chinese government water projects have displaced over 22.9 million people, more than any other type of project in China.⁷⁷ Displacement of people on this level can prove dangerous considering the large populace and its anger over a human security issue. Experts believe that when the project is finally complete, it will be of little use because the water being moved is so heavily contaminated and the resulting environmental damage from constructing the project is irreversible.⁷⁸ China needs to focus on implementing reforms to protect its environment and resources at both the national and local levels. Without

⁷³ Bramhma Chellaney, *Water Asia's New Battleground*, (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 24.

⁷⁴ Moore, 26.

⁷⁵ Chellaney, *Water Asia's New Battleground*, 135.

⁷⁶ Carla Freeman, "Quenching the Dragon's Thirst: The South-North Water Transfer Project—Old Plumbing for New China?" China Environment Forum, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011.

⁷⁷ Chellaney, 228-229.

⁷⁸ *The Economist*, "Desperate Measures," 12 October 2013, at <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21587789-desperate-measures>.

addressing the severe water shortage in China, domestic violence could break out due to the human security need for water.

Air Pollution

China has some of the world's worst air pollution in the world. In fact, in some Chinese cities, the pollution is so severe that it is dangerous for people to be outside. In October 2013, in the northeastern city of Harbin, the smog was so thick that the city practically shut down for days while waiting for the conditions to improve.⁷⁹ Air quality in China has continued to deteriorate as China has become more developed and relied on heavy industry, including burning high levels of coal, for economic growth.⁸⁰ These air pollutants also have a negative effect on agriculture, animals, and ecosystems throughout China. Air, agriculture, and the environment are all things that humans depend on for survival. When pollution is so dangerously high that it negatively affects these aspects of Chinese life, human security is at stake.

These high levels of air pollutants have begun to cause health concerns in Chinese urban areas. According to Zhong Nanshan, the president of the China Medical Association, lung cancer and cardiovascular disease have drastically increased in Chinese urban centers due to the high levels of contaminants in the air.⁸¹ Zhong also warned that air pollution is more dangerous than SARS because people cannot escape air pollutants.⁸² The problem is so severe that the United States Embassy in Beijing measures and reports

⁷⁹ Adam Rose, "China Smog Emergency Shuts City of 11 Million People," *Reuters*, 21 October 2013, at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/21/us-china-smog-idUSBRE99K02Z20131021>.

⁸⁰ Roberts, "A Slowing China Needs Reform."

⁸¹ Jonathan Watts, "Air Pollution Could Become China's Biggest Health Threat, Experts Warn," *The Guardian*, 16 March 2012, at <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/mar/16/air-pollution-biggest-threat-china>.

⁸² *Ibid.*

on the air quality and particulate matter from its facility in Chaoyang District of Beijing. At its peak in January 2013, the Embassy measurement hit 755 which extended beyond the air quality index chart measurements of between 0 and 500.⁸³ This measurement was 20 times greater than what the World Health Organization has established as being safe for humans.⁸⁴ Air pollutants have also affected China's agriculture and livestock. Plants and animals absorb pollution contaminants from their environment. As humans eat these products, they take in these toxins, causing severe health problems. With such high levels of pollution, human security is at risk in China.

Environmental problems such as the shortage of water and severe cases of pollution have already begun to stir activism throughout China. Now that China has transitioned from a totalitarian state to an authoritarian state with a market economy, citizens are less afraid of speaking out for their rights.⁸⁵ Although most protests have not turned violent, their actions show that the Chinese people can mobilize and speak up for themselves. According to many academics, including Bergsten, Gill, Lardy and Mitchell, over the past two decades there has been a drastic increase in the number and size of organized protests throughout China.⁸⁶ In 2006, the number of pollution-related protests was approximately 51,000 according to China's Ministry of Environmental Protection.⁸⁷ Common sources of protest have included anger over industrial pollution, the call against new industrial development, and bringing attention to water pollution. In a country that

⁸³ United States Embassy Beijing, "U.S. Embassy Air Quality Monitor," at <http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/070109air.html>; Wayne Ma, "Beijing Pollution Hits High," *Wall Street Journal*, 14 January 2013, at <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324235104578239142337079994>.

⁸⁴ Edward Wong, "On Scale of 0 to 500, Beijing's Air Quality Tops 'Crazy Bad' at 755," *New York Times*, 12 January 2013, at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/science/earth/beijing-air-pollution-off-the-charts.html?_r=0.

⁸⁵ Chellaney, *Water Asia's New Battleground*, 229.

⁸⁶ Bergsten, Gill, Lardy and Mitchell, *The Balance Sheet: China What the World Need to Know About the Emerging Superpower*, 40-41.

⁸⁷ Chellaney, 229.

faces many of the same economic problems that were explored in the previous case study, combined with such extreme environmental problems, a hazardous human security environment that is very dangerous to the Chinese state is thus created.

Personal Security

The Chinese Communist Party has a poor record of personal security. The 1982 Constitution guaranteed civil liberties to Chinese citizens in principle, but today the Chinese states do not practice them. From the perspective of the international community, along with non-governmental organizations, the Chinese government is an egregious human rights violator. The Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, as well as many countries, have accused China of human rights abuses including suppressing freedom of speech, movement, and religion. China infringes upon many other freedoms and rights to include political freedom, birth control rights, and the extreme use of capital punishment. As stated in the 2012 Human Rights Watch Report:

China continues to be an authoritarian one-party state that imposes sharp curbs on freedom of expression, association, and religion; openly rejects judicial independence and press freedom; and arbitrarily restricts and suppresses human rights defenders and organizations, often through extra-judicial measures.⁸⁸

China argues that many of its policies are aimed at securing the state and maintaining stability. In order for China to remain in power, the officials feel the need to keep the population under strict control. Many civil rights groups argue, however, that Chinese policies go beyond protecting the state and infringe upon citizens' individual rights.

⁸⁸ Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2012: China," at <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-china>.

Human rights violations can be a cause of internal conflict. If people feel their rights have been violated or their personal security is in jeopardy, violence is a possibility.

Human Rights Violations

It is no secret that the Chinese media and internet are closely monitored and censored by the government. This close monitoring is a tool to maintain civil stability and overall control by the Communist Party. China has two main goals in monitoring its citizens. First, they want to keep the public from obtaining information that is viewed as detrimental or embarrassing to the regime. Subject matters including unrest, protests, and the Dali Lama have been previously censored in Chinese media.⁸⁹ Second, the regime wants to keep the population from organizing into large groups that could potentially overthrow the government.⁹⁰ In order to control the news, the Chinese media, to include news programs and newspapers, are all state-run. The media, therefore, only reports on stories that the government approves of. Any news that discusses unfavorable topics such as uprisings like the Arab Spring does not get coverage or the reports are limited.⁹¹ Chinese citizens have access to the internet, but do not have the ability to freely express themselves on blogs or social media. China has a highly sophisticated system of internet censorship and a 'Great Firewall', which prevents outside sites from being accessed.⁹² Some of the banned sites include Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. China has essentially created its own national internet. In 2009, following protests in Xinjiang province, the

⁸⁹ Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E Roberts, "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression," *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 2, (2013), at <http://j.mp/LdVXqN>.

⁹⁰ Thomas Lum, "Social Unrest in China," Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 8 May 2006.

⁹¹ James Fallows, "Arab Spring, Chinese Winter," *The Atlantic*, September 2011, at <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/09/arab-spring-chinese-winter/308601/>.

⁹² William Thatcher Dowell, "The Internet, Censorship and China," *International Affairs*, (2006): 113.

Chinese government hit a kill switch on the internet in that area which lasted for over a year.⁹³ Although censored, Chinese activists have been finding ways to communicate and get their messages out. Activists in China use the internet with caution, aware of the censorship. Today, they are using Weibo, China's form of Twitter, and microblogs to communicate. Some activists have even gone so far as to establish a system of code words in order to communicate around the firewall.⁹⁴ Although China continues to arrest offenders and block sites, determined activists will continue to find ways around the state censorship.

The 1982 Chinese Constitution gives Chinese citizens the right of freedom of religion. Article 64 reads, "No state, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. The state protects normal religious activities."⁹⁵ Although Chinese citizens have the right to religious beliefs on paper, it is far different in practice. Religion is closely monitored throughout China and religious practices are only allowed in government-approved places of worship.⁹⁶ According to the Human Rights Watch, religious institutions must have proper approvals and submit governmental paperwork on its activities, which are subject to audits and tracked by the regime.⁹⁷

⁹³ *Economist*, "China's Internet: A Giant Cage," 6 April 2013, at <http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21574628-internet-was-expected-help-democratise-china-instead-it-has-enabled>.

⁹⁴ Adrienne Mong and Bo Gu, "Chinese Play with Words to Get around Great Firewall," *NBC News*, 24 February 2011, at http://behindthewall.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/02/24/6120879-chinese-play-with-words-to-get-around-great-firewall.

⁹⁵ People's Republic of China, Constitution of the People's Republic of China, 4 December 1982, at <http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html>.

⁹⁶ Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2012: China."

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

For example, Falun Gong is a spiritual discipline that focuses on a moral philosophy of truthfulness, compassion, and forbearance.⁹⁸ The movement started in China in 1992, and by the late 1990s had a strong group of followers estimated at over 70 million people, one of the largest nongovernmental organizations in China.⁹⁹ Falun Gong brought together a wide range of devote followers from different backgrounds including: young people, older generations, rural communities, and urban dwellers.¹⁰⁰ The spiritual group was able to mobilize large numbers of followers quickly and orderly thereby threatening the Chinese government.¹⁰¹ The strength of the group was apparent on April 25, 1999 when over 10,000 Falun Gong members surrounded the Beijing government compound to stage a silent protest.¹⁰² Following this display of strength, the Chinese government grew wary of the group's size and influence and began banning the practice and arresting the leadership. The regime feared such a large, organized group and the possibility of instability this presented. Although this is one group, the crackdown on Falun Gong sets a precedent for other organizations. Although officially banned, the group still exists throughout China, with members practicing in secret.

Human rights activists continue to be targeted as they operate secretly throughout China. The Chinese government continues to arrest and imprison anyone who speaks out on human rights violations. The more China continues to suppress its citizens' rights, the more likely it is that conflict and unrest could ensue. As China continues to grow economically and the population has more access to technology and the international

⁹⁸ Falun Dafa, "A Brief Introduction to Falun Dafa," at <http://en.falundafa.org/introduction.html>.

⁹⁹ Falun Dafa Information Center, "Key Statistics Related to Falun Gong," at <http://www.faluninfo.net/article/909/Key-Statistics-Related-to-Falun-Gong/>.

¹⁰⁰ Andrew Jacobs, "China Still Presses Crusade against Falun Gong," *New York Times*, 28 April 2009, at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/28/world/asia/28china.html?_r=0.

¹⁰¹ Human Rights Watch, "What is Falun Gong," 2002, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/china/China0102-01.htm#P263_25189.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

community, they will likely demand more religious freedom. The citizens of China may also come to see the benefits of a free society as portrayed by western cultures, and demand these equal rights. In fact, in order for China to prosper domestically at the same levels as the United States they likely need to guarantee freedom and human rights to its citizens. The violations of personal security in China also continue to get international attention. The international community continues to place pressure on the regime to give its citizens more rights and freedoms. If China did allow for civil liberties the country would not only be more prosperous but the threat of unrest and instability in China would drastically decrease.

Conclusions

Until now, China has been able to quell protests and suppress the population. The regime has yet to face any real unrest and has been successful in keeping a country of over one billion people stable. How long can the government continue to successfully do this? A massive economic, environmental or social disaster, where a large number of people are collectively organized, combined with international pressures, could result in a regime collapse in China. Some academics argue that China's regime is rather stable and has not yet shown signs of weakness. Do not forget, however, that a communist regime stable in appearance has collapsed quite suddenly before. The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the Ukraine all collapsed without major warning signs due in large part to domestic factors such as those China currently faces.¹⁰³

¹⁰³ Shirk, *China the Fragile Superpower*, 55.

The large number of severe domestic problems the regime faces in China leads me to believe there is a high probability of unrest in China's future. Currently, the conditions are not yet right for such a massive uprising; however, in time this will likely change. Economic growth in China has been the basis for continued stability throughout China for the last several decades. However, as more people face economic hardships as the growth in the Chinese economy begins to slow this could result in domestic unrest throughout China. Add in environmental problems and personal security upsets and China could soon be facing a large and discontent civilian population. A recent example of this was the Arab Spring which began in late 2010, and resulted in the overthrow of several governments as well as political change throughout the Middle East. Although the upheaval was the result of several factors including disenchantment with governments, economic decline, and human rights, this combination of factors made conditions ripe for instability. China faces many of the same problems that the Middle East did prior to the Arab Spring. Although Chinese citizens are more regulated than those in the Middle East, this censorship could exacerbate the problem. It is highly likely that China will see domestic unrest in its future as economic growth slows and more citizens face economic hardships.

As China continues to grow economically, politically and internationally, it needs to remain focused on solving its looming domestic crises. Human security issues including high levels of unemployment, inequality, water scarcity, and human rights violations can lead to domestic unrest and ultimately topple China's rise to power if left unresolved. As China becomes more developed, citizens will come to expect more freedom, human rights, workers' rights, and better protection from environmental threats.

The Chinese regime needs to work to reduce many of its human security problems that are directly connected to the onset of civil conflict. The widespread unemployment must be addressed, especially among the young adult population, who are more likely to participate in civil unrest. In order for stability to continue, Chinese economic growth and development must be maintained. Economic conditions in China are probably one of the most severe human security issues China faces today.

Second, China must address the high levels of dangerous pollution throughout the country. The Chinese people are becoming ill due to poor environmental management. Protests over environmental degradation are increasing in number and size due to the problem's severity and the government's failure to respond.

Lastly, China needs to further guarantee its citizens the basic human rights such as freedom of speech, religion and movement. Although this would mean less censorship and the potential for citizens to organize and overthrow the Communist Party, continuing to keep citizens suppressed, especially as they become more economically developed, may lead to even more civil conflict. The most likely scenario of further denying basic human rights would be unrest. China must act and deal with these looming problems before unrest occurs, and the regime's worst fear becomes reality.

CHAPTER 2: REGIONALLY: HOW CHINA'S RISING POWER AFFECTED RELATIONS WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA

Asia is undergoing a transition in the twenty-first century. This region has some of the fastest growing economies, largest populations in the world, and significant amounts of global defense spending. It is also home to China, who is a rising power, and possibly the next challenger to American hegemony. Relations between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors are becoming increasingly important as China's power continues to grow. China's rising strength has made neighboring states anxious about future relations in the region. With tensions high in the region over territorial disputes, historical animosities, and differences in political ideologies, a shift in the balance of power could lead to conflict. Regional states' response to China's expanding influence will have a major impact on the future of relations in the region as China continues to grow more powerful.

The focus of this chapter is to address how China's rise to power is affecting its interstate relations in Southeast Asia. First, this chapter will explore the characteristics of a rising power and how this power shift will affect regional relations. This will be followed by a discussion of international relations literature focused on state alignment strategies in response to a rising state, which include: balancing, bandwagoning, hedging and engagement. Lastly, three specific relationships will be explored—China's relations with Vietnam, Burma and the Philippines—to investigate the impact of China's rise to power on economic, military and political relations and how these countries are

responding. If China's rise to power is not managed in the near future, its relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors will suffer as a result.

Literature Review

In 1978, China took a major step in reforming its economy by opening up its communist based markets to the world. Since this transformation, China's economy, military strength and political influence has been rapidly increasing, resulting in China's position today as a rising power. China's rising strength has made neighboring states anxious about their relations with China and the new order of the region. A shift in the balance of power could lead to conflict due to escalating tensions over territorial disputes, historical animosities and differences in political ideologies. In order to protect themselves, weaker states can align either with or against a rising power. How China's neighbors decide to align themselves is important in the future of the region.

This literature review explores China's rise to power and why a shift in regional power might impact relations with neighboring countries. It will also analyze the different state alignment strategies that a country may use when interacting with a rising power. There are two main alignment strategies in international relations theory that a state can use to protect itself from a power: balancing against the power or bandwagoning with the power. Examining these theories and understanding why these strategies are used will help determine how China's rise to power is affecting interstate relations in Southeast Asia and ways in which these states might respond.

Understanding how China's rise may impact regional relations is of vital importance for several reasons. Not only is Southeast Asia geographically close, but

China relies on the Southeast Asian states that form the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, better known as ASEAN, for economic benefit. In 2011, ASEAN became China's third largest trader.¹⁰⁴ China relies on these countries for imports including natural resources, mechanical and electrical products and agricultural produce.¹⁰⁵ This region is also strategically important to China. Currently, there are unresolved territorial disputes in the South China Sea, which is centrally located in the region.¹⁰⁶ This conflict is largely based on control over the valuable oil reserves and important sea lanes, which are essential for trade routes and access between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Several Southeast Asian countries lay claim to portions of the sea and these disputes have been a source of contention in the region, only likely to escalate. China and its Southeast Asian neighbors are very closely connected through economic, geographical and political ties, which is why it is important to examine how China's rise to power might affect relations in the region and how states in Southeast Asia are responding to China's rise.

Geographically, China has a large land mass and borders fourteen countries. Several of these neighbors are large and powerful and include states such as India, Russia, and Japan; countries with their own global influence, strong military capabilities and economic importance. Although this chapter focuses on China's relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors, China's regional location is notable. This location, amidst these other large and powerful countries, is why regional cooperation is key for China. As China continues to rise to power, the landscape potentially makes the region more

¹⁰⁴ *Xinhua News*, "China, ASEAN Go Beyond Trade," 18 December 2011, at http://www.china.org.cn/business/201112/18/content_24185240.htm.

¹⁰⁵ *Xinhua News*, "China's imports from ASEAN up 44.8 pct in 2011," 11 January 2011, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-01/20/c_13700143.htm.

¹⁰⁶ Rex Li, "Rising from Within: China's Search for a Multilateral World and its Implications for Sino-US Relations," *Global Governance* (March 25, 2011): 331.

unstable as these other countries contend with China's elevating status. China must manage its military capabilities and rising power in such a way as to not upset these potential rivals. This is why China's soft power approach is vital to China's rise, so not to alarm China's neighbors.

Soft Power

Although it is clear that China has become more powerful over the last few decades, there is still a debate in academia and policy circles as to China's actual intent as a rising power. Perhaps China does not intend to be a full global power as the United States currently is. Several academics take this view including Sheng Ding, who suggests that China's rise to power is based on soft power and therefore is not a threat to other nations.¹⁰⁷ Soft power is defined by Nye as, "The ability to get what you want through attraction rather than through coercion or payments."¹⁰⁸ In other words, to spread diplomacy through policies, values or even cultural means. Ding presents the argument that, "In recent years, not only has China stayed away from military conflicts, but China has also become ever more compliant with international rules and norms."¹⁰⁹ By becoming a member of the World Trade Organization and participating in global missions such as anti-piracy missions, China has established itself as a global partner. China itself has denied reports that it wants to be a global hegemon and insists it is peacefully developing. A recent Chinese government publication explains that, "peaceful development is a strategic choice made by China to realize modernization, make itself

¹⁰⁷ Sheng Ding, "Analyzing Rising Power from the Perspective of Soft Power: A New Look at China's Rise to the Status Quo Power." *Journal of Contemporary China* 19, no. 64 (March 2010): 285.

¹⁰⁸ Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 5.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

strong and prosperous, and make more of a contribution to the progress of human civilization.”¹¹⁰ China does not want others to feel threatened by its power, especially its neighbors in Southeast Asia. China relies on relationships with its regional partners to stay strong in order to bolster its continued rise to power. David Kang also believes that China is not a threat to its neighbors because, “East Asian states actually believe China’s claims and hence do not fear...China’s rise.”¹¹¹ These arguments, however, fail to consider recent Chinese aggressions in the South China Sea and how China’s neighbors to the south have begun to react to this behavior. It also does not account for China’s drastic increase in military spending.

Even though China’s rise to power has been peaceful up to this point, there are no guarantees that China will continue down this path as it becomes more powerful and continues to strengthen its military. Rising powers in the past have been known to become more aggressive as they continue to gain power. Past examples of rising powers include the Soviet Union and the United States. Both of these previous rising powers, for example, got drawn into a nuclear arms race as they were competing for global hegemony. China has begun to show aggressive this behavior as a rising power. It has become increasingly aggressive over territory in the South China Sea and the East Sea. As China’s power continues to increase, so does its influence over other states, possibly leading to conflict or tensions. Southeast Asian states are growing increasingly nervous over China’s aggressive behavior. This anxiety is partly due to China’s past of invasion, conquest and control of many of these countries, which include Vietnam and Burma.

¹¹⁰ Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal, “China’s Peaceful Development,” at http://english.gov.cn/official/2011-09/06/content_1941354.htm.

¹¹¹ David C. Kang, “Why China’s Rise Will be Peaceful: Hierarchy and Stability in the East Asia Region,” *Perspectives on Politics* Vol. 3, No. 3, (2005): 553.

Many Southeast Asian countries find it hard to trust Chinese claims of a peaceful rise due to its aggressive past and current threats. A goal in many Southeast Asian countries has been to “keep larger outside countries from using their relative military strength or political influence to dominate regional affairs or to undermine the freedom of action...”¹¹² In order to confront this rising threat, regional states have begun to utilize state alignment strategies.

State Alignment Strategies

In international relations theory, there are two main state alignment strategies in response to a rising power: bandwagoning and balancing. Bandwagoning and balancing are opposite positions a state can use to protect itself from a rising power.¹¹³ Several other strategies lie in between bandwagoning and balancing and include hedging and engagement. All four of these alignment strategies will be explained using international relations theory and examined in the context of Southeast Asia.

Bandwagoning

The definition and aims of bandwagoning continues to be debated in international relations theory. Walt defines bandwagoning as, alignment with the rising power to avoid the threat of future attacks or as a type of appeasement.¹¹⁴ Scheweller, however, explains bandwagoning as an alignment strategy to be on the winning side or to benefit from a

¹¹² Denny Roy, “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 27, no. 2 (2005): 308.

¹¹³ David C. Kang, “Between Balancing and Bandwagoning: South Korea's Response to China,” *Journal of East Asian Studies* 9, no. 1 (January 2009): 6.

¹¹⁴ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 17.

rising power's gain.¹¹⁵ Weaker states might not only be attracted to the strength of the rising power, but may want to share in the wealth that comes from aligning with someone more powerful. When a state bandwagons with a rising power, they are essentially allowing a rival to gain more power, which according to realism is not usually in the state's best interest.¹¹⁶ Although the weaker state may benefit from the relationship, so will the rising power who now has leverage over those who choose to bandwagon with them. For example, weaker states are more likely to choose bandwagoning, because not only do they have more to gain from a relationship with a stronger country, but they often have fewer options and little resources in order to balance a rising power. Alignment with China, for example, could lead to further economic benefits or military protection, as is the case with Burma. Walt suggests that weaker states are also more vulnerable to pressure used by powers and therefore can be more likely to bandwagon.¹¹⁷ A state may want to bandwagon as a form of appeasement in hopes of avoiding conflict in the future.¹¹⁸ Lastly, a state might also bandwagon due to its geographic location.¹¹⁹ If a state is completely surrounded by rival countries it might have no choice but to bandwagon with them since it is essentially boxed in.

Although many states in Southeast Asia depend on China, especially as an economic ally, bandwagoning has not been an overwhelmingly popular strategy in the region. Burma has traditionally been thought of as bandwagoning with China. Laos and

¹¹⁵ Randall Schweller, "Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory," *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power*, (New York: Routledge, 1999), 10-11.

¹¹⁶ Kenneth N Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, (MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 126.

¹¹⁷ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 173-174.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, 21.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, 23-24.

Cambodia have also been placed into this bandwagoning category.¹²⁰ These states that choose to bandwagon with China not only get Chinese protection but also aid, military, diplomatic, and economic relations. Burma for example receives Chinese military assistance, economic aid, and Chinese protection in the United Nations, in exchange for natural resources, and access to Indian Ocean ports.¹²¹ Kang presents the argument that regional states have traditionally bandwagoned with China in the past and they are likely to bandwagon in the future.¹²² He goes on to point out that, not only do these states have nothing to fear from China, but many of these states rely on the economic relationships they have established and therefore will side with China.¹²³ Kang makes a strong argument against future balancing in the region; however, this argument is based on China's continued peaceful rise to power. Acharya rejects Kang's theory, arguing that many regional states do fear China's rise and will therefore chose to balance this power, not align with it.¹²⁴ This will be especially true if China's rise becomes more violent, causing states to rethink their alignment strategies.

Balancing

Balancing can be defined as actions taken by a state to prevent a stronger power from dominating it.¹²⁵ Theorists have broken up balancing into two types—internal and external. Internal balancing is when a state focuses on its own capabilities to balance a

¹²⁰ Evelyn Goh, "Southeast Asian Perspectives on the China Challenge," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4–5, (2007): 822.

¹²¹ Yun Sun, "China's Strategic Misjudgment on Myanmar," *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, Vol. 31 Iss. 1, (2012): 74.

¹²² David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for a New Analytical Frameworks," *International Security* 27, no 4 (2003): 58.

¹²³ Ibid, 71.

¹²⁴ Amitav Acharya, "Will Asia's Past Be Its Future?" *International Security* 28, no 3. (2003/04): 149-164.

¹²⁵ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 18.

power, which might include building up its military strength, devising strategies, or stockpiling resources.¹²⁶ On the other hand, external balancing is when a state focuses on making new alliances or increases its international cooperation in order to balance the rising power.¹²⁷ Realists believe that states predominantly choose balancing over bandwagoning because it is in one's interest to restrain a rising power before it becomes too powerful. Several theorists, including Waltz, argue that balancing is generally the more preferred and commonly used alignment strategy by both equal and middle powers against a rising power.¹²⁸ Kang however criticizes this theory, arguing that it is based on a European model not appropriate for Asia due to the difference in history, politics, economics, and demography of the region.¹²⁹ What worked for Europe is not always best in Asia. Europe is not only historically, but politically different and international relations theories that worked for it may not apply to Asia. This theory also fails to see that although more often preferred, states do not always have the option to balance rising powers and in some cases they must choose to bandwagon with the rising power as discussed before.

Although Waltz argues that balancing is the most preferred alignment strategy that does not seem to be the case in Southeast Asia. Ho Chung argues that explicit balancing in Southeast Asia has been rare, but elements of the balancing theory are being used against China by several countries including the Philippines, Taiwan and Japan.¹³⁰ Most states, however, are not fully balancing China for a couple of reasons. First, many

¹²⁶ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 168 and 118.

¹²⁷ Ibid, 118.

¹²⁸ Walt, 17-20.

¹²⁹ Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for a New Analytical Frameworks," 58.

¹³⁰ Jae Ho Chung, "East Asia Responds to the Rise of China: Patterns and Variations," *Pacific Affairs* 82, no. 4 (Winter 2009): 660.

countries in Southeast Asia are tied to China economically and do not want to harm that relationship. Second, as Weitz argues, the countries of Southeast Asia could never fully balance Chinese power due to China's size, manpower, equipment, and defense spending.¹³¹ In order for Southeast Asia to effectively balance China, it needs to bring in a larger outside power, such as the United States. Some countries, including the Philippines, have begun to strengthen ties with the United States in recent years and will probably use US power to help balance China in the region. As China's power and aggression increase balancing could become more widely used.

Hedging and Engagement

There are two middle ground alignment strategies between bandwagoning and balancing—hedging and engagement. Hedging, according to Roy, is a strategy where a state keeps its alignment options open against a future security threat.¹³² With hedging there is a certain amount of uncertainty on the part of the aligning state, because hedging is not a concrete strategy, such as bandwagoning or balancing. Engagement, another option, is where a state encourages the rising power to accept the rules of institutions and the international order.¹³³ Schweller explains that the main goal of engagement is to make sure the expanding power is used for peace building and to avoid future conflict.¹³⁴ One problem with the hedging and engagement theories is that it is hard to measure if a state is using these strategies since the terms are less defined than balancing or bandwagoning.

¹³¹ Richard Weitz, "Nervous Neighbors," *World Affairs* 173, no. 6 (March 2011): 10.

¹³² Roy, "Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning," 306.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Schweller, "Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory," 14.

The lines between all these strategies can often become blurred making it difficult to distinguish the degree of hedging from balancing or bandwagoning.

Several academics believe that hedging is a common alignment strategy prevalent in Southeast Asia. Ho Chung describes the alignment pattern in Southeast Asia as, “resorting to the option of hedging...wishing to neither be dominated by the rising China nor to antagonize it....”¹³⁵ Through this strategy states do not have to choose to be with or against Chinese power, instead they can resort to a middle ground. Southeast Asian countries that are thought of as hedging China include Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia.¹³⁶ Roy argues that these states hedge Chinese power because they are not directly threatened to use a bandwagoning or balancing strategy.¹³⁷ Although many of these states are nervous about Chinese rising power, they have other interests in China, such as strong economic relations, which they do not want to jeopardize over an alignment strategy.

Other Alignment Considerations

Before a state decides on an alignment strategy there are several other factors that it must take into consideration. As Walt believes, there are several other threats to consider that may impact how a weaker state chooses to align. Walt lists these other threats as aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions.¹³⁸ First, a country’s aggregate power refers to strength in resources, such as population, industry, and technological capabilities that can pose a threat to others

¹³⁵ Ho Chung, “East Asia Responds to the Rise of China: Patterns and Variations,” *Pacific Affairs* 82, no.4, (2009): 661.

¹³⁶ Roy, 315.

¹³⁷ Ibid, 311.

¹³⁸ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 22-27.

because it gives a power strategic advantage.¹³⁹ China's aggregate power is formidable since it has the world's largest population, and a booming economy along with acquisition of both technology and natural resources. Second, states that are in a closer geographic proximity will pose a larger threat because the projection of power is greater the closer a rising power is.¹⁴⁰ China has a large land mass that directly borders fourteen countries and is relatively close to several others, making it potentially an imposing threat to these neighbors. Applying political pressure and threatening military action is more effective and intimidating the less distance there is between countries. Third, Walt explains offensive power as a state's "ability to threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of another state."¹⁴¹ China has been displaying its offensive power through the buildup and modernization of its military. Lastly, a state who exhibits aggressive intentions is more likely to be a security threat and cause weaker states to align in order to avoid future conflict.¹⁴² China has been viewed as having aggressive intentions by some of its Southeast Asian neighbors and others, including the United States, over rights to the South China Sea. All of these factors need to be taken into consideration by Southeast Asian countries before they choose an alignment strategy against China's rising power.

Hypothesis

It is clear that China has positioned itself as a rising power through its expanding economic markets, modernization of its military, and growing political power. Now that

¹³⁹ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 22.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, 23.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, 24.

¹⁴² Ibid, 25-26.

China is a rising power and a threat to the region, many question how relationships will change and how China's neighbors will react. Although China has good relations with many of its neighbors, these are likely to deteriorate in the future. As China continues to gain power it will increasingly become more aggressive in an effort to secure its national interests and thus straining its relations. Many countries in Southeast Asia will therefore feel more threatened by Chinese power and begin to build up their militaries and look to improve relations with other powers, such as the United States. This will greatly impact relations in the region causing military tensions. China's emerging power has already begun to affect its relations with states in Southeast Asia and transform the region. By examining China's relationships with Vietnam, Burma and the Philippines this chapter will explore how these countries are reacting to China's rising power and how it is affecting the relationships in the region.

Methodology

Relationships between China and its regional neighbors have changed and transformed as China has risen in power. In examining China's interstate relations with other Southeast Asian countries and demonstrating that these countries are increasingly more threatened by Chinese power, this chapter will focus on three specific relationships between China and a Southeast Asian state in detail. This chapter has been organized into three comparative case studies, each selected based on their historic relationships with China and how they have previously aligned themselves. These three case studies will examine Chinese relations with Vietnam, Burma, and the Philippines. Each of these countries has had very different relations with China over the past several decades.

Because there are so many countries in Southeast Asia and in order to best understand how these relations are changing in the region due to China's rise, countries with a wide range of interstate relations with China were chosen. For example, Burma has had very friendly relations and a strong alliance with China, while on the other hand the Philippines have had less diplomatic ties to China and tend to view China's rise as a direct threat. Vietnam's relations with China in the past have tended to be in-between Burma's friendliness and the Philippines' wariness and represent a middle ground relationship. By looking at relationships with China on a wide spectrum this chapter will be able to explore how China's rise is not only affecting relations with these specific countries, but how it could affect states with similar relations in the region as well.

All three case studies have been constructed to analyze interstate relations between China and these selected countries in the past, present and future. First, a brief historical account of relations between China and the selected state will be presented in order to establish a baseline for what relations were like before China's rise to power. This historic portion will be limited to looking at relations since 1978 when China began to open its markets and engage with countries as the modern China that is recognized today. Next, each relationship will then be looked at from both the Chinese perspective as well as from the other state's viewpoint. The main issues of importance will be examined and largely categorized under political, economic, or military relations. Particular attention will be given to how the selected state seems to be responding to the threat of China's rising power and if it is taking any action to address this threat. Finally, this chapter will explore how these interstate relations will change in the future as China continues to gain power. After examining these case studies it will become more apparent

that Southeast Asian countries are progressively feeling more threatened by China's power and aggressive behaviors and are cautiously looking for options to counter this threat.

China-Southeast Asian Relationships

China-Vietnam

China and Vietnam have a long history of conflict, mixed with periods of cooperation. Throughout modern history, the Chinese have invaded Vietnam numerous times, causing Vietnam to be suspicious of Chinese intentions, especially now with its increasing power. Relations between China and Vietnam were strong initially during the Vietnam War, when China came to the aid of North Vietnam in order to fight the Americans.¹⁴³ Relations shifted between these two communist neighbors near the end of the Vietnam War, as Vietnam invaded Cambodia, upsetting diplomatic ties. Tensions eventually escalated to conflict, which led to the 1979 Sino-Vietnam War between China and Vietnam.¹⁴⁴ This war caused a stalemate in relations that lasted over a decade. Finally, in 1991 China and Vietnam reached an agreement to normalize both state and military relations.¹⁴⁵ Interstate relations continued to strengthen and in 1999 both countries signed a treaty to end land border disputes on the Sino-Vietnamese border.¹⁴⁶ Political, state, and military relations have greatly improved since the early 1990's

¹⁴³ Alexander Vuving, "Grand Strategic Fit and Power Shift: Explaining Turning Points in China-Vietnam Relations," *Living with China: Regional States and China through Crises and Turning Points*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 229.

¹⁴⁴ Jing-Dong Yuan, "China ASEAN Relations: Perspectives, Prospects and Implementations for U.S. Interests," Strategic Studies Institute, (October 2006): 32.

¹⁴⁵ Carlyle A. Thayer, "Vietnam and Rising China," *Southeast Asian Affairs*, (January 2010): 394.

¹⁴⁶ Christopher Roper, "Sino-Vietnamese Relations and the Economy of Vietnam's Border Region," *Asian Survey*, Vol 40, No. 6, (Nov-Dec 2000): 1020.

leading to China and Vietnam's strategic partnership, which was signed in 2008.¹⁴⁷

Although relations between the two neighbors have improved since the end of the Cold War, China's rise to power has added another dimension to this complex history.

Chinese Perception of Relations with Vietnam

Relations with Vietnam are extremely important from the Chinese perspective. China looks to Vietnam as a strong strategic partner, in part because of the similar communist political structure. Although relations between these two countries have not always been amiable, China relies on its relationship with Vietnam for several reasons. The most important aspect of this relationship for China is the economic ties. Vietnam provides China with needed natural resources, electrical components, along with many other goods.¹⁴⁸ Over the past decade, China has increased the use of its soft power to engage with Vietnam, largely to diffuse the negative perceptions of China's rise. China also wants to continue good relations with Vietnam in order to keep its southern border stable.

Vietnamese Perception of Relations with China

Although China and Vietnam are currently in a period of cooperation, Vietnam has long feared invasion and domination by its larger and more influential neighbor, China.¹⁴⁹ Vietnam has reason to be concerned about its neighbor's rise to power for several reasons. First, Vietnam is a rather small country compared to China—physically the size of one of China's twenty-two provinces and a total population the size of one of

¹⁴⁷ Thayer, "Vietnam and Rising China," 397.

¹⁴⁸ *Xinhua News*, "China's Imports from ASEAN Up 44.8 Percent in 2011."

¹⁴⁹ Weitz, "Nervous Neighbors," 8.

China's large cities. Second, China is located directly across a border that is relatively flat and easily crossed with a large military force. Just over thirty years ago, China invaded Vietnam and today it still remains a vivid memory by many Vietnamese.¹⁵⁰ Lastly, China is becoming extremely influential on several fronts including politically, militarily, and economically, which could be perceived by Vietnam as a threat. Although Vietnam has much to be concerned over China's rising power, it also has the potential to gain greatly from a relationship with its stronger neighbor. Having established both Vietnam and China's perceptions of their relationships with one another, further analysis is needed on issues of importance between these two countries and how China's rise to power is affecting the interstate relationship.

Chinese-Vietnamese Economic Relations

In 2011, China bypassed Japan for the spot as the world's second largest economy.¹⁵¹ China's economy has grown on average 9 percent a year for the last decade.¹⁵² Because China is such a large economic force, many neighboring states, including Vietnam, have economic interests in China. China, however, also relies on these economic relations, which are key to keeping its economy strong and rate of growth high. Currently, China and Vietnam have mutual trade agreements, foreign direct investments, and several economic development projects between them.¹⁵³ Although there are economic ties, China's rise to power has already begun to negatively affect its economic relationship with Vietnam. For example, China expends time and resources

¹⁵⁰ Acharya, "Will Asia's Past Be Its Future?" 155.

¹⁵¹ The World Bank, "China Overview," 1 March 2014, at <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview>.

¹⁵² Bergsten, Gill, Lardy and Mitchell, *The Balance Sheet, China What the World Needs to Know About the Emerging Superpower*, 19.

¹⁵³ Jing-Dong Yuan, "China ASEAN Relations: Perspectives, Prospects and Implementations for U.S. Interests," 33.

reassuring its economic partners, such as Vietnam, that its rise to power is peaceful and will continue to be in the future. China, however, has not demonstrated this position as it has become more aggressive over disputed territory in the South China Sea, affecting this relationship. Although trade has not stopped or diminished due to the conflict, China's economic partners, especially Vietnam, are now more wary and continue to look to diversify trade relations since China has become unpredictable. Since the mid-1990's, Vietnam has been joining multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).¹⁵⁴ Although there are various reasons for Vietnam to join these organizations, one benefit is that these institutions can help protect Vietnamese interests and buffer Chinese power.¹⁵⁵ Overall, Vietnam may be wary of China's expanding power, but they are still very dependent on the economic relationship with China. This relationship is largely why Vietnam has maintained a hedging alignment strategy and has not fully balanced China. In the future, it is likely that Vietnam will continue to try to diversify its economic relationships and be less dependent on China.

Chinese-Vietnamese Security Relations

China and Vietnam's economic relationship has changed to a small extent, but China's rising power has had an even greater impact on these two countries security relationship. Not only is the China-Vietnam land border a concern for Vietnam, as discussed earlier, but so are the unresolved territorial claims in the South China Sea. In fact, today the main source of tension between China and Vietnam lies specifically in the

¹⁵⁴ Vuving, "Grand Strategic Fit and Power Shift: Explaining Turning Points in China-Vietnam Relations," 239.

¹⁵⁵ Thayer, "Vietnam and Rising China," 399.

competing claims over territory in the South China Sea. Both China and Vietnam claim islands in the sea as their own. This conflict has intensified as China has become more powerful and therefore more aggressive in the quest to claim what it believes to be its. Recently China has not only declared bans on fishing, but also cut the lines of Vietnamese exploratory oil vessels and detained Vietnamese fishing boats.¹⁵⁶ Although these disputes have been ongoing for over six decades, tensions are currently higher than they have been in years. By seizing ships and cutting oil lines, China is provoking other countries in the region, including Vietnam. This increased aggression by the Chinese is due to its rising power. As China has become the larger power in the region, it has been more forceful in using its power to acquire what is in its best interest, regardless of regional relations.

China's aggressive behavior in the South China Sea has especially affected its relationship with Vietnam. From Vietnam's perspective, China is invading its territory and challenging its sovereignty. As China has grown bolder, so has Vietnam, by defying China and defending what it also believes to be its. Although Vietnam has not yet reached the point of balancing Chinese power over this issue, this will most likely change in the future. As security relations between China and Vietnam have deteriorated, Vietnam has been actively increasing its ties with the United States. Directly following the latest trouble over territory in the South China Sea, Vietnam immediately invited the United States to participate in a week long joint naval exercise.¹⁵⁷ Due to the immediate scheduling, this exercise was a direct response to China's rising power and Vietnam's disapproval for China's aggressive behavior. As Vietnam continues to increase its

¹⁵⁶ Weitz, "Nervous Neighbors," 7.

¹⁵⁷ The China Post, "U.S. Vietnam Begin Week Long Naval Drill," 16 July 2011, at <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/asia/regional-news/2011/07/16/309983/US-Vietnam.htm>.

engagement with the United States, it is very likely that Vietnam will look to the United States to help balance Chinese power. Intervention by the United States over this dispute will be further explored in the final chapter.

Although China and Vietnam willingly cooperate, relations have changed since China began its ascent to power. China has increased its use of soft power to convince its neighbors that its increasing strength is of no threat. Vietnam, meanwhile, has been focused on diversifying its relations with several countries within and outside the region. By joining multilateral organizations like ASEAN and building a strong military relationship with the United States, Vietnam is hoping to buffer Chinese power.¹⁵⁸ It is very likely that Vietnam will continue to forge these military and economic relations with other states in order to resist Chinese power. Over time, depending on future Chinese aggression, Vietnam could shift from its current alignment strategy of hedging to balancing Chinese power. This shift has probably begun as it continues engaging with the United States. A future struggle for Vietnam, or other similar Southeast Asian countries, who do not want to fully balance China with the power of the United States, will be finding middle ground between the two powers. Vietnam does not want to become overly dependent on either China or the United States; however, it needs to be careful not to end up trapped between the two powers in the future.

China-Burma Relations

China and Burma have been historically thought of as close allies since the late 1980's and this relationship has continued into the twenty-first century. It is important to

¹⁵⁸ Thayer, "Vietnam and Rising China," 399.

look at a historically strong relationship to see how China's rise to power is affecting relations with one of its closest allies in Southeast Asia. Even as the international community placed sanctions on Burma in the late 1990's, China remained a close ally, and continued to provide the country with economic aid and over \$1.4 billion worth of military weaponry.¹⁵⁹ Burma has long been categorized as bandwagoning with Chinese power for both protection and profit.¹⁶⁰ China also capitalizes on this relationship for its own gain. In fact, the relationship seems to be based on a mutual need and has commonly been labeled as, "a marriage of convenience."¹⁶¹

China-Burma Individual Perceptions of Relations

The Chinese relationship with Burma has been and continues to be largely based on military affairs, economic development, and trade relations. Although both parties have benefited from this relationship, China is specifically focused on securing natural resources and gaining a strategic position in the Indian Ocean byway of Burma.¹⁶² China seems to view its relationship with Burma as secure and stable, largely because Burma remains cut off from much of the world and therefore does not have diverse interstate relationships. China however should not be too confident in this relationship due to the threat of its rise in power and a changing political climate in Burma.

In the past twenty years, Burma has been very dependent on its relationship with China. Sanctions largely cut Burma off from much of the world, causing them to become

¹⁵⁹ Jing-Dong Yuan, "China ASEAN Relations: Perspectives, Prospects and Implementations for U.S. Interests," 37.

¹⁶⁰ Yun Sun, "China's Strategic Misjudgment on Myanmar," 74.

¹⁶¹ Ben Blanchard, "China Casts Nervous Eye at Erstwhile Ally Myanmar," *Reuters*, 25 January 2010, at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/25/us-china-myanmar-idUSTRE60O01120100125>.

¹⁶² *Economist*, "Welcome, Neighbor: China Hosts Another Tinpot Dictator From Next Door," 9 September 2010, at <http://www.economist.com/node/16996935>.

reliant on China for most of its military and economic support.¹⁶³ Burma has also looked to China to provide protection and watch out for its interests in global institutions, such as the United Nations, where it has no representation itself.¹⁶⁴ China has offered economic assistance, including development projects that have built critical transportation and energy infrastructure throughout Burma.¹⁶⁵ Due to Burma's isolation, it has had few options for alignment strategies against China, resulting in its bandwagoning strategy. This strategy, however, could change as Burma reforms and sanctions are dropped. Although Burma has not publically voiced concern over China's rise to power, Burma's recent diplomatic actions including, warming relations with the United States, could possibly be related to the threat China's rise to power poses and its need to diversify relations. By looking more in depth at Chinese-Burmese diplomatic and military relations, the effect of Chinese rising power on this relationship and what the future holds will become more apparent.

Chinese-Burmese Diplomatic Relations

China's rising power has increasingly begun to affect diplomatic relations between China and Burma. Even though Burma has traditionally bandwagoned with China, Burma has recently begun to distance itself from the rising power. As described earlier, China has been investing in Burmese infrastructure for many years. For example, in 2006 a Chinese power company and the Burmese government signed an agreement for the Chinese to construct a \$3.6 billion dollar dam project.¹⁶⁶ After construction of the

¹⁶³ Sun, "China's Strategic Misjudgment on Myanmar," 76.

¹⁶⁴ Blanchard, "China Casts Nervous Eye at Erstwhile Ally Myanmar."

¹⁶⁵ *Economist*, "Less Thunder out of China," 6 October 2012, at <http://www.economist.com/node/21564279>.

¹⁶⁶ "A New Political Era?," *Asia Monitor: South East Asia Monitor Volume 1* 22, no. 12, (2011):7.

project was already underway, in September of 2011, Burmese President Thein Sein abruptly suspended the project. It was reported that the project was suspended due to lack of popular support by the Burmese people.¹⁶⁷ It is, however, speculated that the dam was suspended to lessen Burmese dependence on China and to keep the Chinese government out of Burmese domestic issues.¹⁶⁸ Suspension of this project is significant because this is the first instance where the Burmese government has denied China the right to continue a development project inside Burma's borders. As of 2014, this project has remained suspended. The decision to suspend the construction of the dam has put some strain on the diplomatic relationship between China and Burma and also signaled to China and the world that Burma is not controlled by its neighbor. Perhaps Burma is trying to alter the perception that it is always aligned with China.

Burma is not only suspending development projects to become less reliant on China, but it has also begun to diversify its foreign relationships by entering into diplomatic negotiations with other states, particularly the United States. As China's power continues to rise, Burma does not want to find itself fully dependent on one state that has proven itself aggressive and unpredictable in the past. In December of 2011, Burma welcomed and hosted then United States Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, to begin the process of normalizing relations.¹⁶⁹ Since 2011, the United States and Burma have continued to work together. Sanctions were partially lifted in 2012 and the visa ban on Burmese rulers and business partners was also rescinded.¹⁷⁰ This is another example

¹⁶⁷ *Economist*, "Less Thunder out of China."

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁹ *BBC News*, "Clinton Pledges Improved Burma Ties if Reforms Continue," 1 December 2011, at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15978893>.

¹⁷⁰ *Reuters*, "US Lifts More Sanctions on Myanmar to Support Reforms," 2 May 2013, at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/02/us-myanmar-usa-sanctions-idUSBRE9411AR20130502>.

of how Burma is slowly distancing itself from China, becoming less dependent on them. China's reaction to this Burma's opening has been mixed. The Chinese government publically welcomed the announcement, while Chinese state media was more outspoken.¹⁷¹ The *China Daily* expressed at the time of Clinton's visit that,

Some commentators now fear that Clinton's visit could affect Myanmar's ties with China. Such worries are unwarranted, for the foundation of China-Myanmar ties is not that fragile. China-Myanmar border is now one of peace, friendship and cooperation, with people on both sides co-existing peacefully.¹⁷²

Although Burma's feelings regarding China's rising power have not been made public, it is clear that Burma is pulling back and expanding its interstate relationships to eventually be less reliant on the People's Republic of China.

Chinese-Burmese Military Ties

Military relations have been a key component of China and Burma's relationship. Burma has required both military arms and training, while China has relied on Burma's strategic geographic location in the region. China has provided Burma with much of its military equipment over the past twenty years including jets, armored vehicles, and ships.¹⁷³ China in return, benefits by gaining access to Burmese ports along the Indian Ocean. Strategically, China needs this access due to its ongoing conflicts with India, as it lacks its own access to the Indian Ocean or ports in the region. Because of this strategic advantage, China has been focused on the development of ports in Burma, which will give them the ability to enter the Bay of Bengal for economic benefit and to dock military

¹⁷¹ *BBC News*, "Clinton Pledges Improved Burma Ties if Reforms Continue."

¹⁷² *China Daily*, "US Uses Carrot-and-Stick Policy for Myanmar," 10 December 2011, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-12/10/content_14243680.htm.

¹⁷³ *Asia Times*, "Yangon Still under Beijing's Thumb," 11 February 2005, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/GB11Ae01.html.

vessels.¹⁷⁴ As China becomes more aggressive about acquiring access to the Indian Ocean through Burma, military relations could be affected due to Burma distancing itself and wanting China removed from its domestic affairs. In fact, military relations have not always been completely smooth. In 2009, for example, relations grew tense between the two countries after Burma attacked and expelled the Kokang insurgent group causing thousands of refugees to flood into China.¹⁷⁵ Although Burma has aligned itself and is usually on good terms with China, Burma has not always listened to Beijing or consulted with them before acting. In the future, Burma will likely continue to proceed without consulting China as it works to break itself away from China's grasp.

As Burma continues to form stronger relations with other countries, China has grown increasingly nervous over these relationships, specifically with the United States. Beijing feels the need to cement its relationship, particularly military relations. In fact, directly after announcing Secretary Clinton's visit back in 2011, China invited top Burmese military officials to Beijing in an effort for the two militaries to "strengthen exchanges, deepen cooperation and play an active role in pushing forward the development of comprehensive relations."¹⁷⁶ Both sides agreed to more high level visits, training, and equipment cooperation in the future.¹⁷⁷ Burma is extremely important for China's strategic position and the Chinese are worried that closer relations with the United States could interfere with the strong China-Burma relationship and more importantly China's access to natural resources and the Indian Ocean. Even though

¹⁷⁴ Sun, "China's Strategic Misjudgment on Myanmar," 79.

¹⁷⁵ Joshua Kurlantzick, "Failing State," *Washington Monthly*, May/June 2010 at <http://www.cfr.org/burmamyanmar/failing-state/p22132>.

¹⁷⁶ *Reuters*, "China Pushes Myanmar Military Ties Ahead of Clinton Visit," 28 November 2011, at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/28/us-china-myanmar-idUSTRE7AR0IG20111128>.

¹⁷⁷ *Xinhua News*, "China Myanmar to Enhance Military Ties," 28 November 2011, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-11/28/c_131275049.htm.

Burma has begun to lessen its dependence on China, it still wants and needs Chinese military support. Although Burma is looking to diversify, at the same time it wants to continue to have a good relationship with China in the future without being completely dependent on them.

Future of Chinese-Burmese Relations

Despite China's rising power, relations between China and Burma are still strong, but beginning to change. Although Burma has not publically spoken of its concern over China's increasing power it has begun to take steps to lessen the threat of rising China. This has affected current relations with China. Diplomatically, Burma has begun to distance itself from China by suspending development projects and seeking closer relations with several other countries. China continues to push for a strong military relationship with Burma in order to secure its alliance. Previously this was not a concern for China, but as Burma begins to diversify its relations, China has become more apprehensive that it may lose these ties. Burma has been historically viewed as bandwagoning with China, however, this will likely change in the future. It is not expected that Burma will ever fully balance China, but Burma will continue to move away from a bandwagoning strategy and more towards a hedging strategy. The future of Burmese-Chinese relations will greatly depend on how Burma moves forward on the international stage. Regardless, Burma has begun to position itself to be less dependent on China because of this emerging threat.

China – Philippines Relations

The Philippines have been historically viewed as a strong balancer towards Chinese power.¹⁷⁸ It has also been the most vocal country in Southeast Asia about the threat of rising China and the affect it will have on the region.¹⁷⁹ China and the Philippines have not had a historically strong relationship. In fact, out of the three cases, this relationship has been the most tense. This is in part because of ongoing territorial disputes, but also because the Philippines have and remain close allies to the United States. The Philippines has been very anxious and uncertain about Chinese rising power, which also has greatly impacted relations.

China and the Philippines normalized relations in 1975 and both sides have since signed several bilateral agreements allowing for deeper trade and diplomatic relations.¹⁸⁰ This relationship, however, has changed largely due to Chinese increased power and aggression and the Philippines' uncertainty over China's intentions. Relations between both countries significantly deteriorated following a 2012 naval standoff in the South China Sea.

China-Philippine Military Relations

As China's power has risen, military relations between China and the Philippines have greatly deteriorated, in part, because of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. As discussed in the Vietnam portion, China has become more aggressive over its territorial claims and has made a strong effort to protect these waters, inciting some

¹⁷⁸ Roy, "Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning," 314.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ The Philippine Embassy in China, "Overview of Philippines-China Relations," at http://www.philembassychina.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=93&Itemid=507&lang=en.

Southeast Asian countries, especially the Philippines, and causing naval standoffs. The Philippines have also been one of the few countries in Southeast Asia to directly stand up to Chinese aggression. In April 2012, the Philippines refused to back down as China sent naval vessels in to the disputed area to protect Chinese boats who were fishing illegally. The Philippines confronted these illegal fishermen and found themselves involved in a naval standoff with the Chinese. Although this dispute did not escalate into a larger conflict, it took over two months to end the standoff.¹⁸¹ This incident did change relations between China and the Philippines. China imposed a fishing ban on the entire South China Sea while the Philippines boycotted some Chinese goods.¹⁸² This confrontation has intensified the dispute between China and Philippines and could lead to a future clash as frustration over the situation escalates.

The Philippines, however, has already taken several steps to balance Chinese power including expansion and modernization of its military forces—specifically its navy—and negotiations with the United States over military training and ports to dock US military ships.¹⁸³ Not only have they negotiated with the US, but the Philippines have signed a mutual defense treaty where the US will come to its aid in the event of a military confrontation.¹⁸⁴ The United States has said publically that they would provide assistance to the Philippines in event that China attacks Philippine interests in the sea.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸¹ *Reuters*, “Standoff near Philippines Over; Chinese Boats Keep Catch,” 14 April 2012, at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/14/us-philippines-china-idUSBRE83D03G20120414>.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

¹⁸³ *Reuters*, “US Military Seeks More Access in Philippines,” 9 February 2012, at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/09/us-philippines-usa-idUSTRE8180Q020120209>.

¹⁸⁴ *Phil News*, “Can the Philippines stand up to China?” 13 April 2012, at <http://www.philnews.com>.

¹⁸⁵ *Defense News*, “Navy Chief: US Would ‘Help’ Philippines in South China Sea,” 13 February 2014, at <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140213/DEFREG03/302130031/Navy-Chief-US-Would-Help-Philippines-South-China-Sea>.

China-Philippine Diplomatic Relations

China and the Philippines diplomatic relations have become increasingly strained due to the South China Sea dispute and the Philippines close relations with the United States. In fact, China has recently distanced itself the Philippines. In 2013, the Chinese foreign minister met with counterparts from all of the ASEAN member states, except for the Philippines.¹⁸⁶ China's lack of diplomatic relations towards the Philippines has been labeled diplomatic isolation.¹⁸⁷ Furthermore, following the devastating Typhoon Haiyan, intentional aid poured in from around the world. China, the powerhouse of the region, gave a measly \$100,000 to help in the effort.¹⁸⁸ Through these actions China is sending the Philippines a sign regarding the state of affairs. Although China and the Philippines have never had a strong relationship, relations have significantly deteriorated since the military standoff in the South China Sea in 2012. Relations were further damaged when the Philippines announced it was filing a suit against China over its South China Sea claims in a United Nations tribunal.¹⁸⁹ China maintains that it has not broken international law and refuses to participate in the tribunal.¹⁹⁰ Recommendations from the panel are still pending.

¹⁸⁶David Bosco, "Why is China Giving the Philippines the Cold Shoulder on Typhoon Relief?" 12 November 2013 at www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/12/why_is_china_giving_the_philippines_the_cold_shoulders_typhoon_relief.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid

¹⁸⁹ *Wall Street Journal*, "Philippines Takes China's Sea Claims to Court," 14 October 2013, at <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304330904579135220056016750>.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

Future of Chinese-Philippine Relations

The Philippines have begun to balance Chinese rising power in anticipation of a future conflict. Tensions continue to build between China and the Philippines with neither side working to diffuse the conflict. Instead the Philippines continue to expand its defense capabilities and China exercises its increased power to secure its territory, provoking conflict. The future of relations between these two countries is something of concern. With each aggressive move by China, the Philippines balance China more assertively. This example proves Walt's balancing theory, noted in the literature review, where countries are likely to balance in order to stay independent of a rising power. This case study also demonstrates how important it is to bring in an outside actor to be able to fully balance China, such as the Philippines is doing with the United States.

Going forward, the Philippines' decision to balance China's rising power will likely have a deteriorating effect on its mutual diplomatic and economic relations. China has been displeased with the Philippines decision to deepen its relationship with the United States. In order to avoid deteriorating relations, China will need to back off from the South China Sea dispute and be less aggressive in its attempts to lay claim to the territory. Additionally, the Philippines will need to refrain from being so vocal against China's rise to power. Although the Philippines decision to balance China has not yet affected other states alignment strategies towards China in the region, others could soon follow the Philippines' lead; especially as the United States turns more of its attention to the region.

Conclusions

If China's rise to power is not managed in the near future its relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors will continue to suffer as a result. In fact, some relationships between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors have already been negatively impacted due to China's expanding power. As demonstrated through several case studies, Southeast Asian countries have begun to take steps to distance themselves and become less reliant on this rising power. In all three cases examined, each country has begun to strengthen relations with outside countries, specifically the United States, who is one of the few powers with the ability to counter Chinese power. They are also becoming more reliant on each other through organizations like ASEAN. Although only three countries were focused on in the case studies, it can be expected that others in Southeast Asia are also looking to diversify their foreign relations away from China. Some countries have even begun to strengthen their militaries in response to the threat of China's rise. Ongoing territorial disputes have also hurt diplomatic relations. Although economic ties remain strong between Southeast Asian countries and China, tense military and diplomatic relations could come to affect these economic relations in the future. If things continue as they are China will have difficulty working with several of its neighbors. The Chinese need to better manage its rise to power by being less aggressive and cautious in how it demonstrates this rising power.

CHAPTER 3: GLOBALLY: CHINA'S ASSERTION OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

Although the United States leads the world in economic, political, and military power, China could ultimately challenge US hegemony and change the international balance of power. As China continues to grow in strength, the China-US relationship is becoming more important. Both countries strategically distrust one another and are arguably balancing against each other, increasing the likelihood of a security dilemma, in which each country interprets the other's defensive measures as a threat to its own security. This posturing between the United States and China is evident in the ongoing South China Sea dispute, where economic and strategic interests are at stake. China has grown more aggressive with its neighbors over its perceived territorial rights. This aggressive behavior combined with China's mammoth defense budget, increasing naval power, and attempts to secure alliances, has raised the level of tension in the region. As China's rise to power and aggressive behavior has increased in the South China Sea, the US level of alertness has also been elevated. The United States has become involved in the regional conflict as a result of threats against US allies and US interests, and the freedom of navigation. To counter China's aggression, the United States has been actively strengthening relationships and alliances in the region, and recently announced a military refocus on the Asia-Pacific region. These actions by both states are focused on securing themselves and their allies against one another, potentially causing a security dilemma. The future of US-Chinese relations is currently being played out over the South China Sea conflict.

This chapter examines if China's level of assertion over its territorial rights in the South China Sea affects its relations with the United States. First, this chapter will examine literature looking at arguments both for and against China's rise to power as a threat to the United States. This literature will include a detailed examination of the security dilemma theory and if this could potentially occur between the US and China, as China's power increases. Second, three periods of the South China Sea conflict will be explored as case studies in order to understand Chinese actions and US responses and how this relationship has changed as China has secured more power. The two historical case studies from 1974 and 1988 will provide a baseline of Chinese aggression in the South China Sea along with US responses prior to China becoming a rising power. The third case study, dating from 2010 to present day, will examine how Chinese aggression and the US response have changed with China's power status. Although the South China Sea conflict is only one portion of the China-US relationship, it is significant to the future of relations between these two countries. This chapter concludes that US policy in the South China Sea has greatly shifted over the past three years. This is not due to increased Chinese assertion but rather to China's rising power and increase in military capabilities. China now has the power to support its verbal claims.

Literature Review

In order to better understand US reactions to Chinese levels of assertion in the South China Sea, this chapter will first examine the different viewpoints on China's rise to power. There are generally two views of China's rise: that it poses a threat to US power and security, or that it does not present a threat. First, literature on the argument that

China's rise is a threat to the US will be discussed. Through this argument, the literature review will examine the international relations theory of a security dilemma and look at literature that discusses if such an occurrence is likely. Second, the literature review will examine works which highlight how China's rise to power is for peaceful development and should not be considered a threat to the United States. It is possible that China does not have the intent to utilize its new power and capabilities. Lastly, the literature review will briefly glimpse into US-Chinese relations over the past three decades.

Throughout Asia, different names are used to refer to the South China Sea. Both the territory and the terminology are in dispute. For example, in Vietnam it is called the East Sea, in the Philippines, the West Philippine Sea. In this thesis, the term South China Sea will be used as it is the name most commonly used in the English language and does not reflect a side of this dispute.

Security Dilemma

Realists argue that the international system is anarchic; each state's main concern is its own survival. States, therefore, naturally distrust each other and as a result focus on efforts to increase national security. In order for a state to survive, it must also seek an increased power status.¹⁹¹ As a result of this anarchic system and resulting increase of security and power, a security dilemma can transpire. Herz explains a security dilemma:

Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and usually are, concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the

¹⁹¹ John Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2, (1950): 157.

impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst.¹⁹²

Other states feel less secure due to the increased security measures taken by another. This action can lead to competition as a state responds to having a sense of lowered security, and can negatively harm diplomatic relations. Herz goes on to argue that the security dilemma is an ongoing cycle; the competition for security and power is never ending.¹⁹³ Similarly, Robert Jervis defines a security dilemma as “many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security, decrease the security of others.”¹⁹⁴ The security dilemma theory is instrumental in understanding how states with similar goals end up at odds with each other or even at war.¹⁹⁵ Although neither side usually intends conflict, this can often be the result.

Jervis identifies two main variables that help to define the severity of a security dilemma. These variables are whether defensive weapons can be differentiated from offensive ones, and whether the defensive or offensive side has the advantage in the conflict.¹⁹⁶ Depending on which variables are present, the intensity of the dilemma and threat of conflict is determined. The first of the four cases Jervis presents is when offensive and defensive behaviors are not discernible, but the benefit is in the offense’s favor. In this scenario, the security dilemma is very intense and highly dangerous because neither side can tell what the other is doing, and according to Jervis, an arms race or

¹⁹² Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," 157.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2, (January 1978): 169.

¹⁹⁵ Paul Roe, “The Interstate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a Tragedy?” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 2, (1999): 184.

¹⁹⁶ Jervis, 186-187.

conflict is more likely.¹⁹⁷ The second scenario is where offensive and defensive behaviors are not discernible, but the defense has the advantage. In this case the security dilemma is less intense, and a state can increase its security without being a threat to other states or cause a pending conflict.¹⁹⁸ The third case is when offense and defensive measures are distinguishable, but offensive has the favor. This type of security dilemma is not intense. Although there is the future risk of conflict, the current environment is stable.¹⁹⁹ The final scenario that Jervis presents is where offensive and defensive behavior is discernible and defense has the overall advantage. Jervis believes that this security dilemma is the safest because states focus on its own defenses rather than building offensive capabilities.²⁰⁰ This theory is important when examining the US-China case in determining the severity of a security dilemma, if it exists.

China's increasing military spending, capabilities, heightened aggression, and overall rise to power can be perceived as a threat to the United States. Supporting this argument is the fact that China's military spending has skyrocketed over the last two decades, estimated to be around \$100 billion in 2012, an increase of \$60 billion a year, since 2002.²⁰¹ This large amount of spending is a threat based on the new technology and capabilities China has been able to develop. Much of the military power China is developing is not for peaceful means. "The PLA's growing capabilities are designed to slowly, but inexorably, shift the regional military balance in China's favour until its neighbours conclude that there is little America can do to assist them."²⁰² China continues

¹⁹⁷ Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," 186-187.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, 188.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Peter Singer, "Inside China's Secret Arsenal," *Popular Science* 282, No. 1, (2013): 44.

²⁰² Andrew Krepinevich, "Economist Debates: China's Military," 17 April 2012, at <http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/830>.

to develop ballistic missiles, anti-cruise missiles, and aircraft carriers, all of which present a threat to China's neighbors and US interests in the region.²⁰³ China is an extremely large and powerful country that can easily dominate or defeat its much smaller neighbors with these capabilities. As explored in the previous chapter, China's neighbors have begun to explore other options to lessen reliance and even balance China, who they perceive as a rising threat. China does not need to establish intent to use these new capabilities. By securing weapons systems and new defense technology China has possibly already created a security dilemma with the United States.

Many argue that a security dilemma is already underway between the United States and China.²⁰⁴ Both countries appear to have shifted apart diplomatically over the past several years, due to not only China's rise, but also China's increased aggression and the US pivot to Asia. Dong argues that, "Underlying the growing strategic distrust is an emerging security dilemma...between Beijing and Washington."²⁰⁵ Both sides have arguably begun to rebalance and counterbalance one another. China and the United States both continue to develop weapon systems to use in a future conflict over the South China Sea and continue to strengthen alliances in the region.²⁰⁶ China wants to continue its rise to power, while the United States is becoming anxious about this rise and its effect on US interests in the region. "The two powers are increasingly trapped in an action-reaction cycle, so much so that many lament that the United States and China are doomed for a

²⁰³ Singer, "Inside China's Secret Arsenal," 44.

²⁰⁴ Wang Dong, "Addressing the US-China Security Dilemma," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 17 January 2013, at <http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/01/17/addressing-u.s.-china-security-dilemma/f2rv>; Robert Manning, "The US-China Security Dilemma," *Global Times*, 2 July 2013, at <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/the-uschina-security-dilemma>.

²⁰⁵ Wang Dong.

²⁰⁶ Manning, "The US-China Security Dilemma."

‘strategic collision.’”²⁰⁷ These steps that both China and the United States are taking will be further explored in the last case study.

This security dilemma is not just a result of China’s rising power, but also due to the United States reaction to the power increase. Yang Yi, a retired rear-admiral of the Chinese Navy, believes that both countries may be on the road to a security dilemma, but this is primarily because of US Cold War mentality and its strategic orientation in East Asia.²⁰⁸ Yang argues that perhaps the United States is the actual aggressor in the South China Sea and China is only responding to threats from the US. He believes that China, although increasing its military strength and rising to power, has done so through peaceful methods.²⁰⁹ “...Beijing has always called for resolving them [disputes] through diplomatic negotiations, not reliance on military superiority, intimidation, or threats.”²¹⁰ According to this argument, the security dilemma exists because of US pursuit of interests in the Asian region, not because of China’s increase capabilities.

China's Rise to Power is Not a Threat

The second argument is that China's rise to power and higher levels of assertion over its territorial rights is not a threat to the United States and therefore does not cause a security dilemma. China continues to maintain that its continued rise and increased power is for peaceful development and not a threat to the region, the United States, or global security. Chinese leadership has been cautious with its rise and used soft power as a means to reassure its neighbors and the world that it has no intentions of being a world

²⁰⁷ Wang Dong, “Addressing the US-China Security Dilemma.”

²⁰⁸ Yang Yi, “Navigating Stormy Waters: The Sino-American Security Dilemma at Sea,” *The Defense Monitor*, (April/May/June 2011): 8.

²⁰⁹ Ibid, 6.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

power or an aggressor. Bates and Yanzhong state, “Since the 1990s, China has achieved impressive gains both in terms of soft power resources and the ability to convert the resources into desired foreign-policy outcomes.”²¹¹ China is very successful at getting policy decisions through peaceful means and does not need to use hard measures. As part of this peaceful development, China has continued to forge partnerships with neighboring countries and strategic relationships with other rising powers.²¹² China has also continued to promote trade alliances, both regionally and globally, especially in Africa and Latin America. China has been able to use soft power as a means to secure closer relationships and establish that it is not a threat.

Besides China’s soft power approach, there are several other reasons why China’s does not consider its rise a threat. First, China is bound by high levels of interconnection on the international level. As Roy states, China’s larger economic goals outweigh its need for assertion over these territorial claims.²¹³ China, its neighbors, and the United States are all highly economically dependent on one another and China would not want to risk these partnerships or an economic downturn over an island dispute. China also faces many domestic problems as noted in chapter one, which are top priority for the regime. The country cannot risk instability at home over a territorial problem.

Third, although China is building up its military, it is argued this is for defensive purposes and China restrains itself by first using diplomatic means. For example, rather than escalating disputes in 2011 with Vietnam over oil survey ships, China signed a

²¹¹ Gill Bates and Huang Yanzhong, “Sources and Limits of Chinese ‘Soft Power,’” *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, Vol. 48, No. 2, (2006): 17.

²¹² Ming Xia, “‘China Threat’ or a ‘Peaceful Rise of China?’” *New York Times Online*, 2006, at <http://www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll-china-politics-007.html>.

²¹³ Denny Roy, “The ‘China Threat’ Issue: Major Arguments,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 36, No. 8, (August 1996): 758.

bilateral agreement that sought to peacefully negotiate maritime boundaries in the Spratly Islands.²¹⁴ China has also diplomatically relinquished territory in the past to resolve territorial disputes with countries including, Burma, Russia, and North Korea.²¹⁵ As Dingli Shen discusses, China has continued to restrain military action over the disputes in the South China Sea and has sought peaceful means to handle these issues rather than using force.²¹⁶

Although China's defense spending is high, it is not as high as it could be with a country as large as China. In fact, as Smith argues, much of China's military buildup is concentrated on regional and domestic power projection rather than long-range capabilities.²¹⁷ Smith goes on to explain that even though China has new technology and weapons systems, it is still a long way from being able to threaten the US mainland with them.²¹⁸ Although China has these capabilities, in the numerous incidents that have occurred in the South China Sea, it has not used force since 1988. It should also be noted that China has increased government spending in all sectors of the economy and government, not just in its military budget.

Although China now has a strong military capability, some argue that China does not have the intent to use this force and, therefore, does not present an actual threat. China could be building up its military capability purely for defensive purposes with no intention to use them in asserting its claims over the South China Sea. If China does not

²¹⁴ Keith Bradsher, "China and Vietnam Move to Reduce Tensions in South China Sea," *New York Times*, 12 October 2011, at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/world/asia/china-and-vietnam-move-to-reduce-tensions-in-south-china-sea.html?_r=0.

²¹⁵ *Xinhua*, "China, Russia Solve all Border Disputes," 2 June 2005 at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-06/02/content_3037975.htm; and Dingli Shen, "Economist Debates: China's Military," 17 April 2012, at <http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/830>.

²¹⁶ Dingli Shen, "Economist Debates: China's Military."

²¹⁷ Martin Smith, *Power in the Changing Global Order*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 148

²¹⁸ *Ibid*, 149.

have any intent for use of force then it does not actually present a threat to the US or region. Having military strength does not make a country dangerous until they decide to employ these capabilities.

Finally, there is the argument that China's rise could bring further stability and security to the region rather than an increased threat. A regional power in East Asia could bring further stability because it would establish norms, and also because the neighboring states would have the potential to gain from the regional power. In China's case, regional countries benefit from Chinese trade and investment, leading to further interdependence and, therefore, a more stable region. David Kang agrees with this argument and states that East Asia has been more peaceful today than it has since the Opium Wars. He goes on to point out that the region has become more stable, established strong multilateral institutions, and has increased cooperation through economic, cultural, and political relations.²¹⁹ East Asia is highly interdependent, which brings stability as all of the states are intertwined and tied to each other. When the region as a whole prospers from one country's rise, others in the region often accommodate it in order to benefit.

History of Chinese-US Relations

The Chinese-US relationship has not always been as tense as it appears today. Following Chinese market reforms in 1978 the United States was a key partner in modernizing China into the international system. In fact, China greatly benefited under US world leadership during the 1980s and 90s.²²⁰ The Chinese economy grew

²¹⁹ David Kang, "China Rising: Peace, Power and Order in East Asia," New York: Columbia University Press, (2007): 3.

²²⁰ Thomas Christensen, "Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia," *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Summer, 2006): 82

exponentially, with the help of US investment and China membership to the World Trade Organization. With these reforms and investments China's economy is twenty times larger today than two decades ago.²²¹ Although China and the United States have had several past diplomatic incidents including, the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the mid-air military collision over the South China Sea in 2001, relations were relatively good and stable.²²² This relationship, however, started to change as China's military strength began to increase significantly and the Chinese became more brazen in its rhetoric and actions. This change has become apparent in China's deliberate aggressive actions over the territorial waters of the South of China. For example, in 2009, a Chinese submarine crashed into a US destroyer's towed sonar array as it closely monitored the ship.²²³ The United States has grown more anxious as China has been building aircraft carriers, capturing ship crews in contested waters, and threatening neighbors with military actions over this dispute. Over the past several years the China-US relationship has intensified and the future is unclear.

Hypothesis

China's level of assertion over territory in the South China Sea may not have necessarily changed in the past three decades; it still claims ownership to many of the same islands and the extent of its exclusive economic zone. China's aggression in the South China Sea has gone through cycles, with periods of low and high levels of intensity. China is not currently fighting an armed conflict with anyone over the territory, as

²²¹ Singer, "Inside China's Secret Arsenal."

²²² Susan Shirk, *China Fragile Superpower*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 239-240.

²²³ Bonnie Glaser, "Armed Clash in the South China Sea," Council on Foreign Relations, April 2012, at: <http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883>.

occurred in 1974 and 1988. What has changed, however, is China's level of power, to include its military capability. Now China not only has the rhetoric but also the strength to back up statements of assertion. The United States has become more actively involved because of this increase in capability and power, not because the Chinese are showing more assertion.

With the United States' recent pivot to Asia, the United States took a very strong and public stance on China's position as a rising power. Although the United States helped to develop China three decades ago, China's power status has reached a critical point where the United States feels vulnerable. Both the US reaction to China's rising power and China's response has caused strained relations between both countries. The defensive posturing, military build-up, and rhetoric from both countries lead this chapter to argue that a security dilemma between the United States and China has begun. Although this security dilemma is in the beginning stages and both sides are working to limit its consequences, it has put the United States and China on a dangerous path. This strategic distrust between these countries not only makes them less secure, but increases threats to peace and security regionally and globally as well. The South China Sea dispute may appear to be over a strategic territory, but that is only the surface of the conflict. This conflict has now evolved into a Chinese versus US power and influence struggle. China is trying to buffer US power, while the United States is attempting to remain in control.

Methodology

China's level of assertion over the South China Sea has fluctuated over the past several decades. In order to grasp how China's level of assertion today is affecting its relations with the United States, this chapter will examine two historical case studies of periods of high levels of Chinese assertion in the South China Sea and judge US reactions. The first will look at the 1974 battle of the Paracel Islands between China and Vietnam. The second case study will focus on the 1988 Spratly Island skirmish. This historical context will help us understand the United States role before China became the rising power it is today. Both of these historical case studies were chosen because they reflect periods when China's aggression was at its highest and when the United States was most likely to respond. The third case study will look at the present-day dispute and compare US responses and China's aggression currently.

There are several possible responses that the United States could take because of Chinese assertion in the South China Sea. The first is that the United States could choose not to react, especially if it does not see Chinese aggression as a threat to US interests. Because this dispute is not close to or threatening US territory, the United States could stay neutral. The United States could also be impartial due to involvement in campaigns elsewhere and not choosing to overextend itself. Second, the United States could back its allies in the region, such as the Philippines, who are actively involved in the dispute. It could provide military training, equipment, and assistance as advisors without directly getting involved. In this case, the United States would have a role, but it would not be fully engaged. A third option is that the United States could engage in the disputes if US interests are threatened. This engagement could include an increase in United States'

military presence in the region, or diplomatic involvement. The following case studies will examine instances of US diplomatic or military responses to Chinese aggressive behaviors over the South China Sea claims and determine how China's assertion has affected US response.

Also of note, the South China Sea is only one dispute out of many areas of contention between the United States and China. There are other areas of tensions between these two powers; however, as Kaplan believes the South China Sea conflict is where a clash between the United States and China is most likely.²²⁴

The South China Sea Dispute

The South China Sea is a strategic body of water located off of the southern coast of China. As part of the Pacific Ocean, the South China Sea is a maritime boundary to eight states including Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam; six of which claim portions of the sea. The South China Sea covers approximately 3.7 square kilometers.²²⁵ These waters include several small island chains including the Paracel Islands in the northwest, the Pratas Islands in the northeast, the Spratly Islands in the southeast, and the Scarborough Reef in the central region. These small islands, not the water, are actually what the conflict is over. Although called islands, these landforms are actually reefs, made from volcanic activity, that have very little land

²²⁴ Robert Kaplan, "The South China Sea is the Future of Conflict: The 21st Century's Defining Battleground is Going to be on Water," *Foreign Policy*, August 15, 2011, at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the_south_china_sea_is_the_future_of_conflict.

²²⁵ Sarah Raine and Christian Le Miere, *Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, (New York: Routledge, 2013), 29.

mass and are mostly uninhabitable.²²⁶ This territory is significant not for the land, but for the shipping lanes, fishing rights, natural gas, and oil reserves within—all economic and strategic interests.²²⁷

The ongoing territorial dispute over these waters goes back to the 19th century. Many of these claims are based on various historical records and legal principles, which will briefly be explored. Although this tension is longstanding, many believe that this dispute could be a potential flashpoint for further conflict in the future. Behind this regional territorial dispute is a larger conflict over Chinese rising power and influence. Regional neighbors fear Chinese rising power, especially the modernization of its navy, and its ability to enforce its claims with use of force. China's neighbors have begun to look to others, including the United States, to balance Chinese rising power and aggression.

Economic and Strategic Importance

There are two main reasons countries want control of these islands in the South China Sea. The first is the economic benefit. Control of this area means the exclusive right to mine the highly valuable resources, which are essential to economic development. According to Chinese National Offshore Oil Company, it is estimated that up to 125 billion barrels of oil and 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas may be in the South China Sea.²²⁸ The United States Energy Information Administration, however, argues that the sea holds approximately 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas,

²²⁶ Min Gyo Koo, *Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place*, (New York: Springer, 2009), 139.

²²⁷ Marwyn Samuels, *Contest for the South China Sea*, (New York: Methuen, 1982), 3-5.

²²⁸ US Energy Information Administration, "South China Sea Overview," 7 February 2013, at <http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=scs>.

significantly less than Chinese estimates.²²⁹ These numbers are vastly different, but, in part are due to the lack of mineral exploration that has been done in the sea. Regardless, there is wealth and security in these resources. Now that China is the second largest consumer of oil, it could benefit from having the security of its own offshore supply.²³⁰ The South China Sea is also an important and plentiful fishery. About ten percent of the global fish catch comes from the South China Sea.²³¹

Besides the economic resources, the South China Sea is an important sea lane. It lies between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, at a crossroads between the east and the west. Just in 2012, over 5.3 trillion US dollars' worth of trade traveled through the waters of the South China Sea.²³² This equals over half of global trade, more than the Panama or Suez Canals.²³³ This body of water is an important link between Asia and the United States, vital for free trade and strategic supplies. About two-thirds of South Korea's energy supplies, 60 percent of Japan's, and 80 percent of China's crude-oil imports all come by way of the South China Sea.²³⁴ Cutting off these supplies would have a severe effect on these countries' economies, not to mention affecting the ability to mobilize armies for defense.

In addition to the economic advantage, controlling these waters also brings a strategic advantage. These sea lanes are an essential route between the United States and

²²⁹ US Energy Information Administration, "South China Sea Overview."

²³⁰ US Energy Information Administration, "China: Country Analysis Brief Overview," 30 May 2013, at <http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=ch>.

²³¹ *Reuters*, "Philippines Says China Used Water Cannon on Fishermen in Disputed Sea," 24 February 2014, at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/24/us-philippines-southchinasea-idUSBREA1N0F820140224>.

²³² Glaser, "Armed Clash in the South China Sea."

²³³ Kaplan, "The South China Sea is the Future of Conflict: The 21st Century's Defining Battleground is going to be on Water."

²³⁴ *Ibid.*

its allies in Southeast Asia. If war should break out, control of these vital waterways could mean the difference between victory and defeat.

Exclusive Economic Zone

There are six countries with maritime boundaries on the South China Sea that hold claim to portions of the sea, partially based upon The United Nation's Convention on the Law of the Seas. This convention, which was negotiated between 1973 and 1982, states that a country has rights over the exploration and use of resources up to 200 nautical miles from its coast.²³⁵ Under this convention, any island territory also applies. This 200 nautical mile area is called an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Inside an EEZ, states have exclusive rights to extract resources from under the waters. This is why many states lay claim to portions of the island chains in the South China Sea: to extend their exclusive economic zones and have access to the wealth of oil, natural gas, and fish.

History of the South China Sea

Many of these territorial claims are a complex combination of history and legal issues, often difficult to decipher. China lays claim to approximately 80 percent of the South China Sea.²³⁶ Its claim is often referred to as the nine-dashed line, due to the nine dashed markations China set as its claim back in 1949.²³⁷ This claim extends over 1,200 miles, almost to Malaysia.²³⁸ China argues a historic claim to the Spratly and Paracel

²³⁵ United Nations, "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea," at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.

²³⁶ Raine and Le Miere, *Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes*, 31

²³⁷ Ibid, 34.

²³⁸ Kaplan, "The South China Sea is the Future of Conflict: The 21st Century's Defining Battleground is going to be on Water."

Islands, land that would therefore extend its EEZ and mining rights. Many of the claimants in this dispute trace early claims back to ancient times when explorers, military patrols, and fisherman did surveys and left geographical markers on these reefs.²³⁹ However, according to Buszynski, many of these historic claims do not carry much weight in international law today.²⁴⁰ The dispute over the islands did not begin until the early 1900s when many of these states sought economic benefits and had the strength to ensure sovereignty over territory.²⁴¹ Following decolonization after World War II many of the surrounding countries scrambled to occupy these islands, inlets, and reefs for access to the territory and for many of the strategic reasons already cited.²⁴² These early claims formed the basis of the conflict that still exists today.

1974 Paracel Island Battle

In January 1974, territorial disputes between the Republic of Vietnam and China over portions of the Paracel Islands culminated in a small-scale naval skirmish. This was the first military clash over the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Not only did this battle change the control of the islands, but it also showed that China was willing to go so far as to risk war over these territorial claims.

Prior to the battle, both South Vietnam and China held portions of Paracel Islands and claims to the entire island chain. In the 1970s, resources such as oil and natural gas were increasingly sought after due to an upsurge in energy costs. This caused China and

²³⁹ Raine and Le Miere, *Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes*, 35.

²⁴⁰ Buszynski L. The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.–China Strategic Rivalry, *Washington Quarterly*, (Spring 2012): 140.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Stein Tønnesson “The South China Sea in the Age of European Decline,” *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 40, No.1, (2006): 47.

South Vietnam to be more assertive over their claims. On January 15, 1974, a South Vietnamese navy frigate was sent to survey the islands that South Vietnam held claim to. It found Chinese fisherman on three of its islands setting up huts, digging tombs, and boldly flying the Chinese flag.²⁴³ South Vietnam responded, by sending a navy flotilla to forcibly remove them from its islands. Chinese ships also responded resulting in several days of fighting.²⁴⁴

Both the Chinese and South Vietnamese engaged in skirmishes on the sea between January 16th and 18th.²⁴⁵ These led to a much larger battle that took place on January 19, 1974. The South Vietnamese forces approached the Chinese position and landed forty troops on two of the islands.²⁴⁶ The Vietnamese forces faced strong resistance, and gun fire, and quickly retreated back to their ships where they were outnumbered by advancing Chinese submarines and warships.²⁴⁷ A naval battle ensued and the South Vietnamese took heavy casualties. When the smoke cleared, fifty-three South Vietnamese soldiers had been killed and over forty had been taken prisoners of war.²⁴⁸ The Chinese suffered far less damage with only eighteen soldiers killed in the conflict.²⁴⁹

The battle resulted in China's complete control of the Paracel Islands chain, which it still maintains today.²⁵⁰ Another outcome from the skirmish resulted in greater

²⁴³ Koo, *Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place*, 142.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Ang Cheng Guan, "The South China Sea Dispute Revisited," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* Vol. 54, No. 2, (2000): 202.

²⁴⁶ Time, "Storm in the China Sea," *Time Magazine*, 4 February 1974.

²⁴⁷ Koo, 142.

²⁴⁸ Time, "Storm in the China Sea."

²⁴⁹ Koo, 143.

²⁵⁰ Ang Cheng Guan, 203.

competition elsewhere over the South China Sea.²⁵¹ Now that South Vietnam had been defeated in the Paracel Islands, it began looking for other islands to claim and turned its attention to the Spratly Island chain. This increased competition over the Spratly Island chain led to another skirmish, which will be explored in the subsequent case study.

The United States, who just the year before had pulled out of Vietnam, was still a close ally of South Vietnam. According to historical accounts, the South Vietnamese looked to the United States for help during the skirmish in January of 1974.²⁵² The US Seventh Fleet, which included an aircraft carrier, was stationed at Subic Bay in the Philippines and could have easily assisted the South Vietnamese in the conflict and searched for missing troops.²⁵³ The Seventh Fleet, however, was under strict orders not to assist and to stay completely out of the conflict and vicinity of the Paracel Islands.²⁵⁴ The United States did not take sides and chose to remain neutral throughout the entire skirmish. According to historical records, the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, informed the Chinese Ambassador, “The United States has taken no position in supporting the South Vietnamese claims to these islands.”²⁵⁵

The United States reluctantly did intervene when it was discovered that a Department of Defense employee, Gerald Emil Kosh, had been aboard one of the Vietnamese ships involved in the conflict. According to news reports, he was doing liaison work with the South Vietnamese Navy and was aboard one of the patrol boats.

²⁵¹ Raine and Le Miere, *Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes*, 43

²⁵² Koo, *Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place*, 143

²⁵³ U.S. 7th Fleet, “U.S. 7th Fleet Forces,” at <http://www.c7f.navy.mil/forces.htm>.

²⁵⁴ Chi-Kin Lo, *China's Policy towards Territorial Disputes: The case of the South China Sea Islands*, (New York: Routledge, 1989), 57.

²⁵⁵ National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, (1 November 1973–31 March 1974) at <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d66>.

The patrol left Kosh on Pattle Island for his own safety during the skirmish, but he was later captured by Chinese forces.²⁵⁶ Kosh was brought back to China and held with 48 other Vietnamese prisoners of the war, also captured in the battle.²⁵⁷ After becoming aware of the capture of an American, the US intervened diplomatically. In the same meeting, Henry Kissinger stated to the Chinese Ambassador,

The South Vietnamese government is making a number of representations to international organizations, to SEATO as well as to the United Nations. We wanted to let you know we do not associate ourselves with those representations. We are concerned, however, about the prisoners, and we noted that your government has indicated that the prisoners will be released at an appropriate time.²⁵⁸

Although the United States needed to intervene for the safety of its employee, it was made very clear to the Chinese that the US would not get involved in the conflict or even the complaints before the international organizations. The United States government quietly worked to get its DOD member released, but took no other diplomatic action concerning this conflict.

In 1974, the United States had just emerged from an unpopular, large-scale war abroad and politically did not want to get dragged into another conflict. The United States, two years earlier, had also begun negotiations with the Chinese to open up its economy and to normalize relations between the two countries.²⁵⁹ There are several reasons why the US did not intervene, the most important being that none of its interests at the time were in jeopardy. Although China did threaten US allies, China had not yet become the

²⁵⁶ Time, "Storm in the China Sea," *Time Magazine*, 4 February 1974.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges.

²⁵⁹ Shirk, *China Fragile Superpower*, 25.

regional power. The United States did not yet feel threatened enough to engage China, in part because many of the conditions listed in the literature review were not yet present.

1988 Spratly Island Battle

In the spring of 1988, a similar naval battle broke out between Vietnam and China over another set of islands, the Johnson South Reef, part of the Spratly island chain. Prior to this skirmish, the Chinese had only claimed, not occupied, any of the Spratly Islands.²⁶⁰ As China continued to establish its claim to the Spratly Islands, it began naval deployments to the area and constructed observation posts.²⁶¹ The reef that the Chinese chose for this post was near Vietnamese-controlled islands. Vietnam began to monitor Chinese movements in this portion of the sea, leading to several naval confrontations and eventually a naval battle.

On March 13, 1988, three Vietnamese ships approached the Chinese position on the Johnson South Reef where Vietnamese forces attempted to land and raise a Vietnamese flag in what was a Vietnamese-claimed area.²⁶² Shots were exchanged and a firefight between PLA and Vietnamese forces ensued. As a result of the two-day battle, 74 Vietnamese soldiers were killed and all three Vietnamese boats were sunk.²⁶³ Yet again the Chinese came away unscathed; however, there was no clear outcome in this battle as there had been in the 1974 skirmish. Both China and Vietnam remained partial claimants to portions of the island chain, unlike the skirmish in 1974.²⁶⁴ In fact, both

²⁶⁰ Ang Cheng Guan, "The South China Sea Dispute Revisited," 203.

²⁶¹ Koo, *Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place*, 154.

²⁶² Ang Cheng Guan, 203.

²⁶³ Koo, 154

²⁶⁴ Ang Cheng Guan, 204.

China and Vietnam expanded their claims to the islands and increased their military posture over the disputed territory in the aftermath.²⁶⁵ This increase in tensions over the Spratly Islands made the other claimants, including Malaysia and the Philippines, also race to claim territory, further escalating the dispute.²⁶⁶

Following this even more deadly naval skirmish and escalation, the United States continued to remain neutral. One defense official at the time stated that the United States would not become involved unless the conflict interfered “with freedom of the seas, then we would be prepared to escort and make sure that free navigation continues.”²⁶⁷ The United States continued to make it clear that it would not become involved in a regional dispute. This position was reaffirmed in the United States’ Security Strategy for the East-Asia Pacific Region, “The United States’ interests in Asia have been remarkably consistent over the past two centuries: peace and security; commercial access to the region; freedom of navigation; and the prevention of the rise of any hegemonic power or coalition.”²⁶⁸ The United States’ main goal during this period was stability in the region and becoming involved in this conflict could result in a larger-scale war. At this period the United States was still focused on the Soviet Union and ending the Cold War. None of its major allies were involved and the conflict did not reach the point of impeding freedom of navigation. China also was not yet a rising power, so the US did not need to prevent any aggression posed by a potential hegemon.

²⁶⁵ Koo, *Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place*, 154.

²⁶⁶ Ang Cheng Guan, 204.

²⁶⁷ Zalmay Khalilzad “The United States and Asia, Toward a New US Strategy and Force Protection,” RAND Corporation, (2001), at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1315/MR1315.ch3.pdf, 53.

²⁶⁸ US Department of Defense, “United States Security Strategy for the East-Asia Pacific Region,” February 1995, 5.

Although the United States encouraged a diplomatic end to the conflict, it took no steps to engage both sides in talks. In fact, by this time the United States had substantially reduced its naval presence in the region due to the lack of a threat.²⁶⁹ Even though the 1988 skirmish was more deadly than the one in 1974, the United States was even less involved because one of its employees had not been captured. China, also had not completely occupied the Spratly Islands as it had the Paracel Islands in the aftermath of the 1974 skirmish. Koo believes that if China had, it would have been met with more resistance than in 1974.²⁷⁰ Another reason for the lack of involvement was China-US relations were in good standing and both sides did not want to risk division over a territorial dispute. At this point, the United States still did not feel its interests were threatened by Chinese aggression and thus remained neutral.

2010-Today: The Continuing South China Sea Dispute

Since 2010, tensions between the claimants, especially China, Vietnam and the Philippines, have escalated as the deadline for states to make seabed hydrocarbon claims to the United Nations passed in 2009.²⁷¹ Since the 1988 skirmish, East Asia has been transformed. China is now a rising power, building its political, economic, and military capabilities. China's neighbors have also grown more anxious about China's increased power, especially its military capabilities, combined with its assertions over the South China Sea.

²⁶⁹ Koo, *Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place* 163.

²⁷⁰ Ibid, 156.

²⁷¹ Carlyle Thayer, "China's New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 30 June 2011, at http://csis.org/files/publication/110629_Thayer_South_China_Sea.pdf.

A combination of many small confrontations rather than a single incident has caused this increase in tensions. China has been described as the aggressor in many of these recent instances and blamed for the increase in tensions. For example, in 2011, Chinese maritime patrol vessels came upon a Vietnamese oil survey ship within Vietnam's EEZ and cut the lines.²⁷² Vietnam responded by lodging a formal complaint with China's ambassador, claiming a violation of international law and Vietnamese sovereignty.²⁷³ The Chinese reacted by claiming it abided by "completely normal marine enforcement and surveillance activities in China's jurisdictional area."²⁷⁴ Not only has China gone after oil exploration vessels but it has also targeted Vietnamese fishermen. In five years Vietnam claimed that over 63 fishing boats have been seized by the Chinese in international waters.²⁷⁵

Vietnam has not been the only recipient of recent Chinese increased aggression and harassment. The Chinese have also increased its hostility towards the Philippines. Both Filipino oil exploration vessels and fishermen have been harassed and held by the Chinese. In the most recent case, a Chinese law enforcement ship attempted to drive off Filipino fisherman from Scarborough Shoal by firing a water cannon at them.²⁷⁶ The incident has stirred protests in the Philippines and a Filipino official stated that they hoped for a peaceful resolution, but that they would not hesitate to respond to

²⁷² Buszynski L. *The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.–China Strategic Rivalry*, 141.

²⁷³ Thayer, "China's New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea."

²⁷⁴ *Reuters*, "China Reprimands Vietnam over Offshore Oil Exploration," 28 May 2011, <http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFL3E7GS07E20110528>.

²⁷⁵ Seth Mydans, "U.S. and Vietnam Build Ties with an Eye on China," *The New York Times*, 12 October 2010, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/13/world/asia/13vietnam.html>.

²⁷⁶ *Reuters*, "Philippines Says China Used Water Cannon on Fishermen in Disputed Sea," 24 February 2014.

provocation if needed.²⁷⁷ As a result of this increased aggression, the Philippines lodged a formal complaint to the United Nations over China's claims because Manila had exhausted "almost all political and diplomatic avenues."²⁷⁸ The case is still pending and China refuses to participate.²⁷⁹ It is highly unlikely that the UN will be able to make China adhere to an international ruling over this issue. Both of these examples show that although a battle has not broken out since 1988, tensions remain high and these territorial disputes remain a flashpoint in the region that could erupt at any moment.

Not only have China's neighbors encountered increased Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, but so has the United States. The United States has historically patrolled in, flown over, and conducted military exercises throughout the South China Sea. China does not approve of these activities in the South China Sea and has tried to prevent the United States from entering what is technically international waters and air. China has had a habit of closely tailing US reconnaissance flights over the South China Sea. In 2001, a US and Chinese jet actually collided, causing a large diplomatic crisis. The United States blamed Chinese aggression, while China argued protection over its airspace.²⁸⁰ Even more recently, in December 2013, a United State cruiser was forced to take evasive measures to avoid colliding with a Chinese ship in the South China Sea. According to press reports, the US vessel was observing the Chinese aircraft carrier in international waters, when the small Chinese ship cut across in front of the US ship,

²⁷⁷ BBC, "Philippines Says China Fired Water Cannon on Filipino," 24 February 2014, at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26320383>.

²⁷⁸ BBC, "Q&A: South China Sea Dispute," 15 May 2013, at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349>.

²⁷⁹ Reuters, "Philippines Says China Used Water Cannon on Fishermen in Disputed Sea."

²⁸⁰ Shirk, *China Fragile Superpower*, 234-235.

almost causing a collision.²⁸¹ This was an aggressive move on China's part and would have given the United States more than enough reason to retaliate. Although only words were exchanged in this instance, this situation exemplifies how tense relations are and that these tensions could explode over one small incident.

On top of this upsurge of Chinese assertion, in 2012, Hu Jintao proclaimed that China would develop “‘into a maritime power,’ which would be ‘resolute’ in its safeguarding of China’s maritime rights and interests.”²⁸² China has been crafting itself into this naval power by building up its capability and technology. In 2011, China finished refitting an old Soviet aircraft carrier and joined the small group of states with this sea power.²⁸³ China has also militarized the South China Sea by adding a major naval base on Hainan Island, located only 180 nautical miles from the Paracel Islands. This base will be able to serve as a strategic point for both aircraft carriers and submarines.²⁸⁴ The construction of this base on the South China Sea adds a further element of perceived aggression to the conflict. Along with the sea-based power, China has built up mobile ballistic missile systems that can easily reach many of these disputed areas from the Chinese mainland.²⁸⁵ As explored in the literature review, China’s increase in military capabilities causes other states to worry about Chinese intentions and can cause them to view China as a legitimate threat. Combine China’s military advancements, with its

²⁸¹ Jane Perlez, “American and Chinese Ships Nearly Collided in South China Sea,” *The New York Times*, 14 December 2013, at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/15/world/asia/chinese-and-american-ships-nearly-collide-in-south-china-sea.html?_r=0.

²⁸² Kathrin Hille, “Hu Calls for China to be Maritime Power,” 8 November 2012, at <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ebd9b4ae-296f-11e2-a604-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2vn8baLgc>.

²⁸³ Edward Wong, “Chinese Military Seeks to Extend its Naval Power,” *New York Times*, 23 April 2010, at <http://69.161.159.10/China/Capitalism-Imperialism/ChineseNavyOil-100423.pdf>.

²⁸⁴ Raine and Le Miere, *Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes*, 16.

²⁸⁵ Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces: 2008,” *Nuclear Notebook*, Vol. 64, No. 3, at <http://smtp.www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/capabilities/PDF%20files/Chinese%20Nuclear%20Forces%202008.pdf>, 45.

increase in aggression and China's history of invasion, and the outcome is that China is an emerging threat.

Back in 1974 and 1988 China was a strong force that inflicted a large amount of damage on the Vietnamese. Today, with China's advanced technology and stronger capabilities, China has the ability to cause even more damage. Many of the small countries that also lay claim to these islands have little chance against a power of China's size and strength. Due to China's status as a regional power, it has a responsibility to set the tone for the region and find a balance between cooperation and competition.²⁸⁶ Until China is ready to come to the table and negotiate, the South China Sea dispute will continue. China is a key player in ending this conflict.

Reaction by the United States

No further naval battles have taken place in the South China Sea since 1988; however, the conflict today is receiving renewed interest, especially from the United States. Since 2010, the United States government and media have been increasingly reporting on and discussing this conflict. The events in 1974 and 1988 were barely reported, so what has changed today?²⁸⁷ The South China Sea conflict has not intensified; in fact, some might argue that the dispute has quieted with the lack of physical military skirmishes.²⁸⁸ Aggression by China over this territory has also not drastically increased since the 1970s or 80s. It can be argued that China has even lessened its assertion because

²⁸⁶ Raine and Le Miere, *Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes*, 18.

²⁸⁷ Time, "Storm in the China Sea."

²⁸⁸ M. Taylor Fravel, "China's Strategy in the South China Sea," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2011) at <http://taylorfravel.com/documents/research/fravel.2011.CSA.china.strategy.scs.pdf>, 306-7.

an armed conflict has not broken out since 1988. So why, now is the United States more interested in the South China Sea Conflict?

As seen in the two previous case studies, the United States' policy towards the South China Sea conflict was to remain neutral and intervene only if freedom of navigation was in jeopardy. Today, this has changed and the United States is taking a more active role in the conflict. At the core of the United States' China policy is the recent 'Pivot to Asia.' Announced by the Obama Administration in November 2010, this rebalance is aimed at refocusing United States' government resources on the Asia-Pacific region. Secretary of State at the time, Hilary Clinton, also published an article in *Foreign Policy* calling for:

Six key lines of action: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening our working relationships with emerging powers, including China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights.²⁸⁹

The Obama Administration denies that this rebalancing is entirely due to China's rise; however, several academics argue that it is the only reason to focus so many resources on a region that was overlooked two decades ago. In Clinton's six key lines of action, China is the only country named with a focus on issues in and with China.

As part of the Pivot to Asia, the United States has begun to refocus defense and political resources on the Asia-Pacific region. In October 2011, the United States and Australia signed an agreement to establish a US base that would house approximately 2,500 Marines in Darwin, off the northern coast of Australia.²⁹⁰ The Chinese reacted by

²⁸⁹ Hilary Clinton "America's Pacific Century," *Foreign Policy*, 11 October 2011, at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century.

²⁹⁰ Jackie Calmes, "A U.S. Marine Base for Australia Irritates China," *The New York Times*, 11 November 2011, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/world/asia/obama-and-gillard-expand-us-australia-military-ties.html?pagewanted=all>.

arguing that the United States is escalating military tensions and encircling China.²⁹¹ The United States has also sought closer relations with countries in Southeast Asia. For example, the United States has strengthened its alliance with the Philippines through military exercises, providing military equipment, and establishing a staging point for US troops and equipment.²⁹² As chapter two discussed, these relations may be in part due to China's neighbors wishing to balance this rising power. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman responded with, "It may not be quite appropriate to intensify and expand military alliances and may not be in the interest of countries within this region."²⁹³

The United States has also been increasing its diplomatic rhetoric over the territorial dispute. Official language by US policymakers has intensified compared to the language used during the 1974 and 1988 skirmishes. In 2010, at an international meeting in Hanoi, then Secretary of State Hilary Clinton made a speech that outlined the United States' new policy in the South China Sea.²⁹⁴ These principles included "respect for freedom of navigation, peaceful resolution of disputes, freedom of commerce, negotiation of a Code of Conduct for dispute resolution and, most relevant here, the view that claims to water could only be based on legitimate land-based claims."²⁹⁵ This was the first time that the United States outright rejected China's claims. More recently, in early 2014, the Obama Administration stepped up its rhetoric and challenged China's nine-dashed line claim in the South China Sea. Several high level officials inside the administration have

²⁹¹ Calmes, "A U.S. Marine Base for Australia Irritates China."

²⁹² US Department of State, "US Relations with the Philippines," 31 January 2014, at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2794.htm>; US Department of Defense, "Hagel Praises Unbreakable US-Philippine Alliance," 30 August 2013, at <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120696>.

²⁹³ Calmes.

²⁹⁴ Jeffery Bader, "The U.S. and China's Nine Dashed Line: Ending the Ambiguity," The Brookings Institute, 6 February 2014, at <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/02/06-us-china-nine-dash-line-bader>.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

called on China to, “adjust [its claim] to bring it into accordance with international law of the sea.”²⁹⁶ They have also threatened that if China establishes a South China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, as it did in the East China Sea, the United States would change its military posture in the region.²⁹⁷ Previous US policy was to stay neutral in this territorial dispute; however, it is now clear that the United States has definitely altered its position on this territorial dispute.

The United States claimed early on that it would become involved in the South China Sea conflict only if its interests, particularly freedom of navigation, were infringed upon. US interests in the region have clearly changed. As made apparent through the historical case studies, the United States is more concerned about the possibility of conflict in the South China Sea today than in previous years. Why is this? Combine China’s rising power, with its increasing naval capabilities, its expansive claims, and its history of evoking violence over this territory and China appears quite threatening.²⁹⁸ The United States is working to curb Chinese aggression, influence, and power in the region. As the current hegemon, the United States has a lot at stake from China’s rise.

Security Dilemma

With continued military buildup and increased aggression by China and the United States’ pivot to Asia, a security dilemma is ongoing between these two states. As noted in the literature review, in order for a security dilemma to exist, both states must strategically distrust one another. This can be seen between China and the United States

²⁹⁶ Zachary Keck, “US Challenges China’s Nine-Dashed Line Claim,” *The Diplomat*, 12 February 2014, at <http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/us-challenges-chinas-nine-dash-line-claim/>.

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea,” 307.

over the South China Sea conflict. The standard example of a security dilemma is World War I. Although China and the United States do not have a physical border, a security dilemma still applies. The United States has a worldwide navy and has built up a presence in the Asia-Pacific area. China is working to match US naval power. Offensive and defensive capabilities can still be increased on both sides. Both China and the United States have shown aggressive tendencies, which have caused further military buildup and diplomatic problems. Although both governments have not acknowledged this occurrence, the evidence is in China's rhetoric, continued military expansion, and aggressive maneuvers, and the United States' pivot to Asia.

When comparing the current situation over the South China Sea to Jervis' defensive-offensive chart from the literature review, the security dilemma fits in the category where offensive and defensive measures are distinguishable, but offensive has the favor.²⁹⁹ Jervis notes that in this type of security dilemma future conflict is possible, but not immediate. Case in point, there is not an immediate threat of conflict between the United States and China over the South China Sea. A more likely scenario would be China becoming involved in a skirmish with a US ally, such as the Philippines, drawing the United States into the conflict.

The dispute over the South China Sea is intrinsically important to both the United States and China as evident in both parties' recent policies and actions. China has already risked many of its relationships with neighbors over this territorial dispute. As explored in the second chapter many of the regional states are anxious over China's increased power and aggression as shown in the South China Sea. These neighbors are worried because China now has the strength to support its rhetoric and claims. China has risked

²⁹⁹ Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," 186-187.

these relationships through its highly aggressive behavior all in pursuit of this territory and the resources beneath. For China the South China Sea also holds a nationalist sentiment, which it does not want to let go of. The United States has also made it clear that Asia, including the South China Sea dispute, is a major focus for the United States government. The US policy of rebalancing to Asia has shifted a lot of US foreign policy goals to this region and the United States is ready to take a more active role. The United States has repeatedly told allies in the region that the US would come to their aid in the event of a conflict, thereby showing US commitment to allies in the region. Although it is unclear exactly how involved the United States would become if conflict broke out in the South China Sea, the US does have many interests in the region that would be at stake. The United States continues to affirm this position with continued military assists in the region and high level government visits to the region, most recently President Obama, in April 2014.

Conclusions

China's level of increased assertion and aggression over the territorial disputes in the South China Sea is not a new trend. China displayed these high levels in both 1974 and 1988 when it used military force in order to support its claims. Two things have changed, however: China's rising power status and the response by the United States. The change in response by the United States is directly linked to Chinese rising power and advancing military capabilities. During the 1974 and 1988 incidents the United States did not respond because China did not represent what the United States considered to be a true threat to its national security. Both of those skirmishes were between neighboring

countries, over some strategic islands, with very little relevance to the United States. Now that China is a larger power in the region and could come to threaten US power, the US considers China's level of assertion over the territorial rights in the South China Sea a realistic threat.

The future of relations between the United States and China is fragile. The ongoing security dilemma is dangerous and could result in conflict if either side gets too carried away. In order to mitigate the threat of the security dilemma, both countries need to engage in continued cooperation through military exchanges and diplomatic channels. They have the difficult task of turning a relationship of distrust into one of reassurance. This type of mutual cooperation will set both countries on the path to a stronger relationship and therefore

CONCLUSIONS

China is a rising power, not just regionally, but globally. This rise in power has affected governmental affairs on all three levels: domestic, regional, and international. Although China's rise to power has largely been peaceful up to this point, this could likely change in the future as regional and global partners continue to react to China's rise. Changes to the regional or even global power structures can have adverse effects on the international environment, causing states to choose sides and take up alignment strategies. Countries are currently unsure of what to expect from China's increasing power. China has shown two different sides of its rising power, one of soft power and a second of aggression and force. Will China be a rising power who employs soft power or use force to secure its interests? Although China is quickly building and strengthening its military, political, and economic capabilities there are other internal and external factors that China must consider and address in its rise to power.

On the domestic level, the Chinese government must work to alleviate the severe human security issues within China. As concluded earlier, these issues could ultimately stagnate China's rise to power because this rise is built upon an unstable domestic base that could easily collapse. As China continues to become more globalized, combined with the increase in economic development, the population will come to expect more from the government, including rights, liberties, and protection. If Chinese citizens do not receive basic needs and services this could be catalyst for unrest and possible uprising in China. China has a large population that if organized could ultimately overthrow the regime. As observed through the case studies, Chinese citizens have already begun to increase their voice, as demonstrated through the drastic increase in protests over the past several years.

Economic, environmental, and personal human security issues are all intertwined, leading this thesis to argue that there is more than one human security issue within China that has the potential to cause unrest. All of these human security issues negatively impact the Chinese population in one way or another and because many of these issues are intertwined a problem in one area could affect another. For example, if a person falls ill due to the poor air quality, this in turn could come to have economic impacts as they could no longer work. The Chinese government has been focused on keeping economic levels high and unemployment low; however, they also need to focus on other human security factors including environmental and personal security. These problems could equally cause unrest within China. The Chinese government has slowly begun to address some of these human security issues including inequality and pollution levels. However, the rate at which the Chinese government is dealing with these problems has not kept up with the growth rate of these issues and the problems continue to multiply. China must address all of these human security issues in order to better secure its future, meet its economic goals, and gain military strength.

On the regional level, China must continue to engage with its neighbors through soft power interactions. China's neighbors have begun to diversify relations so as not to be so reliant on a rising power whose true intentions are unclear. China must not only continue to assure its regional neighbors of its soft power approach, but also demonstrate that approach to them. China needs to become involved in more soft power projects that do not just benefit China's national agenda. Many of China's soft power projects explored in chapter two have an internal benefit to China. For example, the dam that China was constructing in Burma, while it helped provide power to the Burmese people it

was primarily for China's gain. The Chinese spun the project as economic development for Burma in order to win its approval. This, however, caused the local people to distrust Chinese intentions and the project was ultimately cancelled. Recently, China began to use a hospital boat to visit countries and provide medical assistance. This is the type of soft power influence China needs to utilize in order to win over the hearts and minds of many neighboring countries. As China comes to bear the responsibility of a regional power it needs to demonstrate it has regional interests in mind.

China also needs to reassess its aggressive positions in regional conflicts, like the South China Sea dispute. China's hostile behavior towards many of its regional neighbors over these disputes could enhance distrust and lead to countries diversifying their relations, as was observed with Burma, Vietnam, and the Philippines. These countries do not want to be reliant on a rising power that cannot be trusted or depended upon. Historic relations with China suggest that China has a past of invasion and violence against its neighbors. Many of these countries recall that history and China's capabilities. Now that China has even more military strength, regional countries have become more concerned. The threats and aggressive posturing that China has demonstrated over territorial disputes has only added to the regional anxieties. As a result of Chinese increased military power and aggressions, Burma and Vietnam have begun to move towards a different alignment strategy regarding China.

China's rise to power has had global affects as well. This impact is clearly visible in the ongoing South China Sea dispute. Prior to China's rise to power the United States showed little interest in this regional territorial dispute. It has only been since China's rise that the US has been more active in the conflict and more vocal concerning Chinese

aggression. This has led to the South China Sea conflict potentially becoming a flash point for violence between the two countries. China's assertion in the South China Sea conflict has not necessarily increased, in fact, it has decreased because China has not engaged in a naval battle over the dispute since 1988. What, however, has increased is China's power and military capabilities. This has allowed China to be more brazen in pursuing its territorial claims. It now has the ability to support its rhetoric and many of the smaller neighboring states have little chance of defense against a larger power. This is why China's rise to power has made the United States more anxious over China's intentions in the South China Sea. Prior to this the US showed little concern because China has less capability and did not pose the same threat it does today.

With continued military buildup and increased aggression by China and the United States' pivot to Asia, a security dilemma is ongoing between these two states. In order for a security dilemma to exist, both states must strategically distrust one another. This can be seen between China and the United States over the South China Sea conflict. China has strengthened its military power and increased rhetoric and aggression over its territorial claims, while the United States has rebalanced military capabilities to focus on East Asia. This current path is extremely dangerous and has the potential to put global affairs at risk. Not only are the relations between both countries affected, but this could cause other states to feel the need to choose a side.

In order to prevent a future conflict between the United States and China over the South China Sea dispute, both countries need an enhanced dialog. They need to be forthright with any action they are taking in the region, so as not to alarm the other. They should also engage in further military exchanges in order to try to overcome the strategic

distrust that currently exists between both countries. Taking these cooperative steps will lessen tensions in the region and make for a more stable environment.

As China continues into the 21st century as a rising power, the Chinese government will continue to focus on several key goals in order to maintain China's new status and stability on the home front. The Communist Party's main focus will be on preserving stability domestically as its economy, environment, and social structure continue to change. The Chinese citizens are ultimately the state's largest threat and China will remain focused on suppressing any potential uprising or social movements. China must remain stable in order to continue its rise to power and its domestic stability will take precedent over many other goals sought by the regime.

China will also continue to focus on projecting its new rising power status around the world. This rising power will continue to seek raw materials and access to foreign markets across the globe to fuel its economic growth. The South China Sea dispute also is and will continue to be a main goal of the regime. For China this dispute is much more than access to territory and resources, it is also about Chinese power projection in the region.

The world has begun to change due to the arrival of a new power. China's rise to power is extremely influential in many aspects of foreign affairs today. This thesis pointed out several factors that need to be considered when attempting to understand the impact that China's rise could ultimately have. China's rise to power still faces obstacles, especially domestically, which could undermine much of the economic, political, and military power China has established. Unfortunately, as examined through the last three chapters, it appears that China has allowed its rise to power to take on a negative

connotation. This is largely a result of China's aggressive behavior directed at its neighbors. China must recognize what its role as a rising power is in the larger global arena and how it wants to impact the world.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- The 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. "Socialism with Chinese Characters." <http://english.people.com.cn/90002/92169/92211/6275043.html>.
- Acharya, Amitav. "Will Asia's Past Be Its Future?" *International Security* 28, No 3. (2003/04) 149-164.
- Asia Monitor: South East Asia Monitor*. "A New Political Era? " Vol. 22, No. 12, (2011).
- Asia Times*. "Yangon still under Beijing's Thumb." 11 February 2005.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/GB11Ae01.html.
- Axworthy, Lloyd. "Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First." *Global Governance* Vol. 7, No. 1 (Jan.–Mar. 2001): 19-24.
- Bader, Jeffery. "The U.S. and China's Nine Dashed Line: Ending the Ambiguity." The Brookings Institute. 6 February 2014.
<http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/02/06-us-china-nine-dash-line-bader>.
- Bates, Gill & Yanzhong, Huang. "Sources and Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power.'" *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* Vol. 48, No. 2, (2006): 17-36.
- BBC News*. "Clinton Pledges Improved Burma Ties if Reforms Continue." 1 December 2011. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15978893>.
- BBC News*. "Philippines Says China Fired Water Cannon on Filipino." 24 February 2014.
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26320383>.
- BBC News*. "Q&A: South China Sea Dispute." 15 May 2013.
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349>.
- Bergsten, Fred; Freeman, Charles; Lardy, Nicholas & Mitchell, Derek. "China's Rise: Challenges and Opportunities." Washington DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies, (2008).
- Bergsten, Fred; Gill, Bates; Lardy, Nicholas & Mitchell, Derek. *The Balance Sheet, China What the World Needs to Know About the Emerging Superpower*. New York: Public Affairs, 2006.
- Beasley, Ryan & Snarr, Michael. *Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior*. Washington DC: QC Press, 2002.

- Blanchard, Ben. "China Casts Nervous Eye at Erstwhile Ally Myanmar." *Reuters*. 25 January 2010. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/25/us-china-myanmar-idUSTRE6001120100125>.
- Bosco, David. "Why is China Giving the Philippines the Cold Shoulder on Typhoon Relief?" *Foreign Policy*, 12 November 2013. www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/12/why_is_china_giving_the_philippines_the_cold_shoulder_typhoon_relief.
- Bradsher, Keith. "China and Vietnam Move to Reduce Tensions in South China Sea." *The New York Times*. 12 October 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/world/asia/china-and-vietnam-move-to-reduce-tensions-in-south-china-sea.html?_r=0.
- Buszynski, Leszek. "The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.–China Strategic Rivalry." *Washington Quarterly*, (Spring 2012): 139-156.
- Calmes, Jackie. "A U.S. Marine Base for Australia Irritates China." *The New York Times*. 11 November 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/world/asia/obama-and-gillard-expand-us-australia-military-ties.html?pagewanted=all>.
- Chan, Minnie. "Graft is Widening Wealthy Gap: Economist." Quoted by "Social Unrest in China." *South China Morning Post*, 20 September 2005.
- Chellaney, Bramhma. *Water Asia's New Battleground*. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011.
- China Daily*. "US Uses Carrot-and-Stick Policy for Myanmar." 10 December 2011. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-12/10/content_14243680.htm.
- The China Post*, "U.S. Vietnam Begin Week Long Naval Drill," 16 July 2011, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/asia/regional-news/2011/07/16/309983/US-Vietnam.htm>.
- Chinese Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. "6.99 Million Grads set to Hit Market." http://www.china.org.cn/china/2013-05/20/content_28875009.htm.
- Chinese Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People's Republic of China. "First Half of the 725 Million New Jobs in Cities and Towns." http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/dongtaixinwen/shizhengyaowen/201307/t20130726_108635.htm.
- Christensen, Thomas. "Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia." *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Summer, 2006): 81-126.

- Cincotta, Richard. "Half a Chance: Youth Bulges and Transitions to Liberal Democracy." *Environmental Change and Security Program Report*, 13, (2009): 563-595.
- Clinton, Hilary. "America's Pacific Century." *Foreign Policy*. 11 October 2011.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century.
- Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anne. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 56, No. 4, (October 2004): 563-595.
- Defense News*. "Navy Chief: US Would 'Help' Philippines in South China Sea." 13 February 2014.
<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140213/DEFREG03/302130031/Navy-Chief-US-Would-Help-Philippines-South-China-Sea>.
- Ding, Sheng. "Analyzing Rising Power from the Perspective of Soft Power: A New Look at China's Rise to the Status Quo Power." *Journal of Contemporary China* 19, No. 64, (March 2010): 255-272.
- Dong, Wang. "Addressing the US-China Security Dilemma." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 17 January 2013.
<http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/01/17/addressing-u.s.-china-security-dilemma/f2rv>.
- Dowell, William Thatcher. "The Internet, Censorship and China." *International Affairs*, (2006).
- The Economist*. "China's Consumer Led Growth." 20 October 2012.
<http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/10/rebalancing-china>.
- The Economist*. "China's Internet: A Giant Cage." 6 April 2013.
<http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21574628-internet-was-expected-help-democratise-china-instead-it-has-enabled>.
- The Economist*. "Desperate Measures." 12 October 2013.
<http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21587789-desperate-measures>.
- The Economist*. "Economist Debates: China's Military," 17 April 2012, at
<http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/830>.
- The Economist*. "Less Thunder Out of China." 6 October 2012.
<http://www.economist.com/node/21564279>.
- The Economist*. "Welcome, Neighbor: China Hosts Another Tinpot Dictator From Next Door." 9 September 2010. <http://www.economist.com/node/16996935>.

- Fallows, James. "Arab Spring, Chinese Winter." *The Atlantic*. September 2011.
<http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/09/arab-spring-chinese-winter/308601/>.
- Falun Dafa. "A Brief Introduction to Falun Dafa."
<http://en.falundafa.org/introduction.html>.
- Falun Dafa Information Center. "Key Statistics Related to Falun Gong."
<http://www.faluninfo.net/article/909/Key-Statistics-Related-to-Falun-Gong/>.
- Fravel, M. Taylor. "China's Strategy in the South China Sea." *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2011):
<http://taylorfravel.com/documents/research/fravel.2011.CSA.china.strategy.scs.pdf>.
- Freeman, Carla. "Quenching the Dragon's Thirst: The South-North Water Transfer Project—Old Plumbing for New China?" China Environment Forum, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011.
- Glaser, Bonnie. "Armed Clash in the South China Sea." Council on Foreign Relations. April 2012. <http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883>.
- Goh, Evelyn. "Southeast Asian Perspectives on the China Challenge." *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4–5, (2007): 809-832.
- Guan, Ang Cheng. "The South China Sea Dispute Revisited." *Australian Journal of International Affairs*
 Vol. 54, No. 2, (2000): 201-215.
- Hart, Andrew F., and Bruce D. Jones. "How Do Rising Powers Rise?" *Survival* (00396338) 52, No. 6 (2010): 63-88.
- Hendrixson, Anne. "The 'Youth Bulge': Defining the Next Generation of Young Men as a Threat to the Future." A Publication of the Population and Development Program at Hampshire College No. 19, (Winter 2003): 1-4.
- Herz, John. "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma." *World Politics* Vol. 2, No. 2, (1950): 157-180.
- Hille, Kathrin. "Hu Calls for China to be Maritime Power." 8 November 2012.
<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ebd9b4ae-296f-11e2-a604-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2vn8baLgc>.
- Hu, Shen. "China's Gini Index at 0.61, University Report Says." *Caixin Online*.
<http://english.caixin.com/2012-12-10/100470648.html>.

- Human Rights Watch. "What is Falun Gong." 2002.
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/china/China0102-01.htm#P263_25189.
- Human Rights Watch. "World Report 2012: China." <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-china>.
- Jacobs, Andrew. "China Still Presses Crusade against Falun Gong." *New York Times*. 28 April 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/28/world/asia/28china.html?_r=0.
- Jae Ho, Chung. "East Asia Responds to the Rise of China: Patterns and Variations." *Pacific Affairs* 82, No. 4 (Winter 2009): 657-675.
- Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma." *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2, (January 1978): 167-214.
- Jing-Dong, Yuan. "China ASEAN Relations: Perspectives, Prospects and Implementations for U.S. Interests." Strategic Studies Institute. October 2006.
- Kanbur, Ravi and Zhang, Ziao-Bo. "Which Regional Inequality? The Evolution of Rural-Urban and Inland-Coastal Inequality in China from 1983-1995. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, Vol. 27, No. 4, (1999): 686-701.
- Kang, David C. "Between Balancing and Bandwagoning: South Korea's Response to China." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 9, No. 1 (January 2009): 1-28.
- Kang, David C. "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for a New Analytical Frameworks." *International Security* 27, No. 4 (2003), 57-85.
- Kang, David C. "Why China's Rise Will Be Peaceful: Hierarchy and Stability in the East Asia Region." *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 3, (2005): 551-554.
- Kaplan, Robert. "The South China Sea is the Future of Conflict: The 21st Century's Defining Battleground is Going to be on Water." *Foreign Policy*. August 15, 2011. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the_south_china_sea_is_the_future_of_conflict.
- Keck, Zachary. "US Challenges China's Nine-Dashed Line Claim." *The Diplomat*. 12 February 2014. <http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/us-challenges-chinas-nine-dashed-line-claim/>.
- Khalilzad, Zalmay. "The United States and Asia, Toward a New US Strategy and Force Protection." RAND Corporation, (2001).
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1315/MR1315.ch3.pdf.

- King, Gary & Murray, Christopher JL. "Rethinking Human Security." *Political Science Quarterly* 116, (2002): 585-610.
- King, Gary; Pan, Jennifer & Roberts, Margaret E. "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression." *American Political Science Review* 107, No. 2, (2013), <http://j.mp/LdVXqN>.
- Koo, Min Gyo. *Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place*. New York: Springer, 2009.
- Kurlantzick, Joshua. "Failing State." *Washington Monthly*. May/June 2010.
<http://www.cfr.org/burmamyanmar/failing-state/p22132>.
- Lardy, Nicholas R. "China's WTO Membership." *The Brookings Institute*. 27 February 2009. <http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/21627>.
- Li, Rex. "Rising From Within: China's Search for a Multilateral World and its Implications for Sino-US Relations." *Global Governance* 17, (2011): 331-351.
- Litao, Zhao & Yanjie, Huang. "Unemployment Problem of China's Youth." East Asia Institute. 28 April 2010. <http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB523.pdf>.
- Lo, Chi-Kin. *China's Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands*. New York: Routledge, 1989.
- Luhby, Tami. "China's Growing Middle Class." April 26, 2012.
<http://money.cnn.com/2012/04/25/news/economy/china-middle-class>.
- Lum, Thomas. "Social Unrest in China." Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 8 May 2006.
- Ma, Wayne. "Beijing Pollution Hits High." *Wall Street Journal*. 14 January 2013.
<http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732423510457823914233707999>.
- Manning, Robert. "The US-China Security Dilemma." *Global Times*. 2 July 2013.
<http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/the-uschina-security-dilemma>.
- Mason, T. David. & Clements, Jonathan. "Tiananmen Square Thirteen Years After: The Prospects for Civil Unrest in China." *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Fall 2002): 159-189.
- McLaughlin, Kathleen E. "Why China Won't Revolt." *Global Post*. 5 March 2011.
<http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/110304/why-china-wont-revolt>.

- McNamara, Robert S. *The Essence of Security: Reelections in Office*. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.
- Mong Adrienne & Gu, Bo. "Chinese Play with Words to Get around Great Firewall." *NBC News*. 24 February 2011.
http://behindthewall.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/02/24/6120879-chinese-play-with-words-to-get-around-great-firewall.
- Moore, Scott. "Climate Change, Water and China's National Interest." *China Security*, Vol. 5 No. 3, (2009): 25-39.
- Mydans, Seth. "U.S. and Vietnam Build Ties with an Eye on China." *The New York Times*. 12 October 2010.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/13/world/asia/13vietnam.html>.
- Nef, Jorge. *Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability*. International Development Research Centre. Ottawa, (1999).
- Norris, Robert S. & Kristensen, Hans M. "Chinese Nuclear Forces: 2008." *Nuclear Notebook*, Vol. 64, No. 3, <http://smtplib.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/capabilities/PDF%20files/Chinese%20Nuclear%20Forces%202008.pdf>.
- Nye, Joseph. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2005.
- Paris, Roland. "Human Security, Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?" *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 2, (Fall 2001): 87-102.
- Pei, Minxin. "Creeping Democratization in China." *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 6, No. 4, (October 1995): 65-79.
- Pei, Minxin. "Strategic Asia 2006-2007: Trade, Interdependence and Security." The National Bureau of Asian Research.
http://www.nbr.org/publications/strategic_asia/pdf/Preview/SA06/SA06_ChinaReform_preview.pdf.
- People's Republic of China. Constitution of the People's Republic of China. 4 December 1982. <http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html>.
- People's Republic of China. "The 10th Five Year Plan (2001-2005)." http://english.gov.cn/2006-04/05/content_245624.htm.
- People's Republic of China Official Web Portal. "China's Peaceful Development." http://english.gov.cn/official/2011-09/06/content_1941354.htm.

Perlez, Jane. "American and Chinese Ships Nearly Collided in South China Sea." *The New York Times*. 14 December 2013.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/15/world/asia/chinese-and-american-ships-nearly-collide-in-south-china-sea.html?_r=0.

Phil News. "Can the Philippines Stand up to China?" 13 April 2012.
<http://www.philnews.com>.

The Philippine Embassy in China. "Overview of Philippines-China Relations."
http://www.philembassychina.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=93&Itemid=507&lang=en.

Raine Sarah, & Le Miere, Christian. *Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes*. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. New York: Routledge, 2013.

Ramzy, Austin. "Migrant Workers Suddenly Idle in China." *Time*. 1 February 2009.
<http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1868667,00.html>.

Reed, Laura & Tehranian, Majid. "Evolving Security Regimes." *Worlds Apart: Human Security and Global Governance*. Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research, New York, (1999): 23-47.

Reuters. "China Pushes Myanmar Military Ties Ahead of Clinton Visit." 28 November 2011. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/28/us-china-myanmar-idUSTRE7AR0IG20111128>.

Reuters. "China Reprimands Vietnam Over Offshore Oil Exploration." 28 May 2011.
<http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFL3E7GS07E20110528>.

Reuters. "Philippines Says China Used Water Cannon on Fishermen in Disputed Sea." 24 February 2014. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/24/us-philippines-southchinasea-idUSBREA1N0F820140224>.

Reuters. "Standoff near Philippines over; Chinese Boats Keep Catch." 14 April 2012.
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/14/us-philippines-china-idUSBRE83D03G20120414>.

Reuters. "US Lifts More Sanctions on Myanmar to Support Reforms." 2 May 2013.
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/02/us-myanmar-usa-sanctions-idUSBRE9411AR20130502>.

Reuters. "US Military Seeks More Access in Philippines." 9 February 2012.
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/09/us-philippines-usa-idUSTRE8180Q020120209>.

- Roberts, Dexter. "A Slowing China Needs Reform." *Bloomberg Businessweek*. 9 October 2013. <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-10-09/a-slowng-china-needs-reform>.
- Roberts, Dexter. "Divining Unemployment in China." *Bloomberg Businessweek*. 26 July 2013. <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-07-26/divining-unemployment-in-china>.
- Roberts, Dexter. "Premier Li Keqiang Wants More Chinese in the Cities." *Bloomberg Businessweek*. 6 June 2013. <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-06-06/premier-li-keqiang-wants-more-chinese-in-the-cities>.
- Roe, Paul. "The Interstate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a Tragedy?" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 2, (1999): 183-202.
- Roper, Christopher. "Sino-Vietnamese Relations and the Economy of Vietnam's Border Region." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 40, No. 6, (Nov-Dec 2000): 1019-1041.
- Rose, Adam. "China Smog Emergency Shuts City of 11 Million People." *Reuters*. 21 October 2013. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/21/us-china-smog-idUSBRE99K02Z20131021>.
- Ross, Michael. "What do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?" *Journal of Peace Research*, 41, (2004): 337-356.
- Roy, Denny. "The 'China Threat' Issue: Major Arguments." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 36, No. 8, (August 1996): 758-771.
- Roy, Denny. "Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 27, No. 2 (2005): 305-22.
- Samuels, Marwyn. *Contest for the South China Sea*. New York: Methuen, 1982.
- Schweller, Randall L. "Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory," *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power*. Edited by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross. London: Routledge, 1999.
- Shirk, Susan. *China Fragile Superpower*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Singer, Peter. "Inside China's Secret Arsenal." *Popular Science* 282, No. 1, 2013.
- Small, Melvin & Singer, David. *Resort to Arms: International and Civil War, 1816-1980*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982.
- Smith, Martin. *Power in the Changing Global Order*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012.

Sun, Yun. "China's Strategic Misjudgment on Myanmar." *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 2012, Vol. 31 No. 1, (2012): 73-96.

Time Magazine. "Storm in the China Sea," 4 February 1974.

Thayer, Carlyle. "China's New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea." Center for Strategic and International Studies. 30 June 2011.
http://csis.org/files/publication/110629_Thayer_South_China_Sea.pdf.

Thayer, Carlyle A. "Vietnam and Rising China." *Southeast Asian Affairs*. (January 2010): 392-409.

Tønnesson, Stein. "The South China Sea in the Age of European Decline." *Modern Asian Studies* Vol. 40 No.1, (2006): 1-57.

Ullman, Richard. "Redefining Security." *International Security*, Vol. 8 No.3, (1983): 129-153.

United Nations Development Programme. *Human Development Report*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

United Nations. "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea."
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.

United States 7th Fleet. "U.S. 7th Fleet Forces." <http://www.c7f.navy.mil/forces.htm>.

United States Department of Defense. "United States Security Strategy for the East-Asia Pacific Region." February 1995.

United States Department of Defense. "Hagel Praises Unbreakable US-Philippine Alliance." 30 August 2013.
<http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120696>.

United States Department of State. "US Relations with the Philippines." 31 January 2014.
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2794.htm>.

United States Embassy Beijing. "U.S. Embassy Air Quality Monitor."
<http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/070109air.html>.

United States Energy Information Administration. "China: Country Analysis Brief Overview." 30 May 2013. <http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=ch>.

United States Energy Information Administration. "South China Sea Overview." 7 February 2013. <http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=scs>.

United States National Archives. Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, (1 November

1973–31 March 1974) <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d66>.

Vuving, Alexander. "Grand Strategic Fit and Power Shift: Explaining Turning Points in China-Vietnam Relations," *Living with China: Regional States and China through Crises and Turning Points*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Wall Street Journal. "Chinese Survey Shows Higher Jobless Rate." <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323316804578164784240097900.html>.

Wall Street Journal. "Philippines Takes China's Sea Claims to Court." 14 October 2013. <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230433090457913522005601675>.

Walt, Stephen M. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.

Walt, Stephen M. "The Renaissance of Security Studies." *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (March 1991): 211-239.

Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.

Wang, Ya Ping. *Urban Poverty, Housing and Social Change in China*. New York: Routledge, 2004.

Watts, Jonathan. "Air Pollution Could Become China's Biggest Health Threat, Experts Warn." *The Guardian*. 16 March 2012. <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/mar/16/air-pollution-biggest-threat-china>.

Weitz, Richard. "Nervous Neighbors." *World Affairs* 173, No. 6 (March 2011): 6-15.

Wong, Edward. "Chinese Military Seeks to Extend its Naval Power." *New York Times*. 23 April 2010. <http://69.161.159.10/China/Capitalism-Imperialism/ChineseNavyOil-100423.pdf>.

Wong, Edward. "On Scale of 0 to 500, Beijing's Air Quality Tops 'Crazy Bad' at 755." *New York Times*. 12 January 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/science/earth/beijing-air-pollution-off-the-charts.html?_r=0.

The World Bank. "China Overview." 1 March 2014. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview>.

- The World Bank. "GDP Per Capita."
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>.
- Xia, Ming. "'China Threat' or a 'Peaceful Rise of China'?" *New York Times Online*.
2006. <http://www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll-china-politics-007.html>.
- Xinhua News*. "China, ASEAN Go Beyond Trade." 18 December 2011.
http://www.china.org.cn/business/2011-12/18/content_24185240.htm.
- Xinhua News*. "China's Imports from ASEAN up 44.8 pct in 2011." 11 January 2011.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-01/20/c_13700143.htm.
- Xinhua News*. "China Myanmar to Enhance Military Ties." 28 November 2011.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-11/28/c_131275049.htm.
- Xinhua News*. "China, Russia Solve all Border Disputes." 2 June 2005.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-06/02/content_3037975.htm.
- Xinhua News*. "China's Urban Population Suppressed Rural by 2011." 28 May 2013.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/video/2013-05/28/c_132414171.htm.
- Yahuda, Michael. *Towards the End of Isolationism: China's Foreign Policy After Mao*.
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983.
- Yang, Yi. "Navigating Stormy Waters: The Sino-American Security Dilemma at Sea."
The Defense Monitor, (April/May/June 2011): 5-8.

Melissa A. Ackermann

EDUCATION

August 2005-May 2009

Washington College, Chestertown, MD

Bachelor of Arts, International Studies, *cum laude*

September 2007-December 2007

Royal Holloway University of London, Egham, UK

Study Abroad Semester

June 2011-May 2014

Johns Hopkins University, Krieger School of Arts & Sciences

Master of Arts, Global Security Studies

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

February 2008-May 2008

United States Department of State

Consular Intern at Embassy Nicosia, Cyprus